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ABSTRACT 
Constitutionalists believe that the Equal Protection Clause died 
during the early decades of the twentieth century. We aim to correct the 
record on this claim and, in the process, demonstrate equality’s long-
held aspirations to political theory. Decades before Professor John 
Hart Ely and public choice, equal protection aspired to be a principle 
of governance as much as a principle of classification or 
discrimination. This tradition was not limited as is modern equality law 
to race, sex, or even caste, but aimed to tie equality to the duties of 
representatives to govern for all, not simply for some. This Article 
argues that early twentieth-century equal protection law strove in 
imperfect ways for a theory of abusive representation; it naïvely hoped 
that the generality of legislation could bind majorities to minorities. To 
resurrect and articulate an analogous modern theory would require far 
more than law-office history; it would require fleshing out what the old 
theory of equality failed to do: to construct a convergence-forcing 
method that would tie the fate of legislative majorities to that of 
minorities. In that spirit, we offer a proposal that emphasizes (à la the 
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new governance literature) the power of “embedded constitutionalism,” 
a proposal that combats abusive representation by forcing the active 
consideration and deliberation of constitutional values in more 
powerful institutions—in this case, legislatures. 
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INTRODUCTION 
It is one of the great historical tropes of constitutionalists that the 
Equal Protection Clause died in the late-nineteenth century. If what 
one means by that claim is that the Equal Protection Clause afforded 
little protection to groups now protected, that is correct. But it is 
wrong to believe that the idea of equal protection was moribund in 
the early part of the twentieth century. Too many constitutionalists,1 
 
 1. See, e.g., Norman Dorsen, Equal Protection of the Laws, 74 COLUM. L. REV. 357, 358 
(1974); Gerald Gunther, The Supreme Court, 1971 Term—Foreword: In Search of Evolving 
Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1, 48 
(1972) (citing Buck’s “usual last resort” proposition as true of an earlier day); Philip P. Kurland, 
Egalitarianism and the Warren Court, 68 MICH. L. REV. 629, 638 (1970) (same). This is also the 
message of the most influential equal protection article of the twentieth century. See Joseph 
Tussman & Jacobus tenBroek, The Equal Protection of the Laws, 37 CAL. L. REV. 341, 341 
(1949) (stating in the first paragraph that the Equal Protection Clause had suffered “eighty 
years of relative desuetude” and quoting Holmes’s statement for support). This view remains an 
assumption of those who engage constitutional history, see 1 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE 
PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS 119 (1991); Michael Klarman, An Interpretive History of Modern Equal 
Protection, 90 MICH. L. REV. 213, 214 (1991) (citing Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 395 
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have fallen for the pithy saying of Justice Holmes who, in the 
infamous Buck v. Bell2 decision of 1927, wrote that the “equal 
protection clause” was the “last resort” of the constitutional lawyer.3 
In this Article, we correct the record that Justice Holmes’s 
aphorism obscures and show that a constitutional common law of 
equal protection existed in the early part of the twentieth century. In 
correcting the historical record, we do not aim to resurrect an 
enchanted past. The equal protection law of the early decades of the 
twentieth century is, from a modern perspective, a tragedy: the law 
repeatedly avowed its commitment to equality in a world that mocked 
its realization.4 But legal history seeks not only to judge the past but 
also to reveal the present. Even tragedies present learning 
opportunities if they suggest a different way of addressing old 
problems.5 History is an important tool for criticizing and 
destabilizing intellectual dependence on concepts born in the present. 
This truism is particularly important here as the history of equality 
examined in this Article is intertwined with the history of substantive 
due process, a highly controversial doctrine associated with judicial 
activism because it strikes down state laws as violating substantive 
rather than procedural rights.6 
This Article uses history to challenge modern constitutionalists’ 
ideas of equality, teasing out a strain of thought that once struggled to 
reflect notions of political theory and governance. In Part I, we 
 
(1978) (Stewart, J., concurring); (Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 208 (1927)), as well as those simply 
considering modern issues, see Rebecca L. Brown, Liberty, The New Equality, 77 N.Y.U. L. 
REV. 1491, 1493 n.8 (2002) (citing Buck for the proposition that equal protection was once the 
“last resort” of equality arguments); Suzanne B. Goldberg, Equality Without Tiers, 77 S. CAL. L. 
REV. 481, 494 (2004) (same). 
 2. Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 207–08 (1927) (upholding the constitutionality of forced 
sterilization). 
 3. Id. at 208. 
 4. In a sense this should not be surprising, as the structure of litigation tends to prefer the 
repeat play of the “haves.” See Marc Galanter, Why the “Haves” Come Out Ahead: Speculations 
on the Limits of Legal Change, 9 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 95, 123 n.72 (1974). 
 5. Precedent requires lawyers to look for the present in the past in the following sense: 
lawyers are taught to look for cases “on point.” In the case of equal protection, lawyers look for 
cases involving modern problems of sex, race, and gay rights, and finding nothing, conclude that 
there is no law of equal protection. History, in our view, is essential to disrupt this precedential 
fallacy. For a demonstration of just how relentlessly presentist the modern system of precedent 
is and how it requires reading the present into the past, see VICTORIA F. NOURSE, IN RECKLESS 
HANDS: SKINNER V. OKLAHOMA AND THE NEAR TRIUMPH OF AMERICAN EUGENICS 15–16, 
151–52 (2008).  
 6. Gunther, supra note 1, at 42 (equating substantive due process with the “repulsive 
connotation” of value-based judicial review). 
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document the lost history of equal protection in federal and state 
courts, focusing on two conflicting ideals—one of classification and 
the other of governance—demonstrating that the Equal Protection 
Clause was not moribund during these decades. In Part II, we use this 
history to challenge three scholarly truisms: first, the basic doctrinal 
notion that equal protection has always been about classification 
simpliciter; second, the idea that representational or political-process 
theories are modern, post–World War II ideas; and third, the more 
recent claim by historians that the early law of equal protection 
resolves the Lochner substantive due process problem. Each of these 
claims, we argue, is incorrect. 
In Part III, we urge that the history of equal protection invites 
the reader to imagine the possibility of a postidentity, postformal 
equality law based on a robust theory of political representation. We 
evaluate recent attempts by some scholars and courts to revive a 
version of the equal protection law from this period known as “class 
legislation.”7 We argue that simply transferring the old doctrine of 
class legislation to the present will fail if scholars and judges do not 
articulate a sustained theory of equal governance. In Part IV, we 
conclude by suggesting that, in its ideal state, equal governance 
requires a convergence-forcing mechanism—one which catalyzes 
legislative rather than judicial action. Drawing from corporate and 
agency law, we argue that the state should embrace its duty to protect 
minority interests. We show in this Part that a governance theory of 
equality may generate new solutions to old problems, such as 
Congress’s decades-long refusal to address gross racial disparities 
between crack and powder cocaine penalties.8 
 
 7. Jack M. Balkin, How New Genetic Technologies Will Transform Roe v. Wade, 56 
EMORY L.J. 843, 855 (2007) (“[L]imits on abortion are a form of class legislation . . . .”); Melissa 
L. Saunders, Equal Protection, Class Legislation, and Color Blindness, 96 MICH. L. REV. 245, 
334 (1997) (suggesting that class legislation can aid resolving voting rights cases); see also Mark 
G. Yudof, Equal Protection, Class Legislation, and Sex Discrimination: One Small Cheer for Mr. 
Herbert Spencer’s Social Statics, 88 MICH. L. REV. 1366, 1387 (1990) (exploring “the idea that 
the historical concept of equal protection, rooted in the nineteenth-century commitment to 
equality under law and animus to class legislation, is fully applicable to discrimination on the 
basis of sex”). 
 8. While this Article was in press, Congress did make changes to the crack cocaine 
penalties, but after more than a decade of calls to change the rules by commentators and the 
Sentencing Commission. See U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, SPECIAL REPORT TO THE CONGRESS: 
COCAINE AND FEDERAL SENTENCING POLICY EXECUTIVE SUMMARY xiv (1995), available at 
http://www.ussc.gov/crack/execsum.pdf (recommending revision of the “100-to-1” sentencing 
disparity between crack and powder cocaine); David A. Sklansky, Cocaine, Race, and Equal 
Protection, 47 STAN. L. REV. 1283, 1306–11 (1995). 
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I.  TWO STRANDS OF EQUAL PROTECTION 
The history of equal protection law from the late-nineteenth 
century until the mid-twentieth century has largely been lost. In part, 
this is because legal scholarship is relentlessly normative and the cases 
of yesteryear disappoint normative expectations: modern scholarship 
looks back with disdain at the thin veil of legal equality that 
rationalized massive racial segregation and the political exclusion of 
over half the population (women)—and yet pronounced itself 
devoted to equality.9 From the perspective of the present, the equality 
law of old was a tragedy of formalism: the law proclaimed its 
faithfulness to equality openly and often but did nothing to attack 
massive and real inequalities of race and sex. Given this well-known 
tragedy, it is tempting to believe that Justice Holmes was correct 
when he pronounced equality’s death. But Holmes was wrong: equal 
protection doctrine was not dead in 1927 when he claimed it was the 
“usual last resort” of the constitutional lawyer.10 As close attention to 
his words suggests, it was a “usual” argument,11 a frequent claim in the 
first three decades of the twentieth century, and its history is 
intertwined with a doctrine largely forgotten—a doctrine called “class 
legislation.” 
Constitutionalists have forgotten the “old” equal protection law 
at least in part because contemporary equality doctrine is relentlessly 
traitist, a kind of adjective law that limits its ideal of equality to 
characteristics, such as sex and race, of individuals and groups.12 This 
history shows that equality was not always imagined as false 
stereotype or group generalization; instead, it was an ideal of 
democratic governance, an ideal that aimed to honor laws only when 
they joined the haves and have-nots within the legislative process. 
This tradition has been obscured by the fact that many of the cases 
 
 9. See, e.g., Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 551 (1896) (upholding “separate but equal” 
laws); Minor v. Happersett, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 162, 178 (1874) (upholding the disfranchisement 
of women); Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130, 137–39 (1872) (upholding a state law 
prohibiting women from practicing law). 
 10. Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 208 (1927). 
 11. Id. 
 12. E.g., Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 326 (2003) (racial classifications); Gratz v. 
Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 275 (2003) (racial classifications); United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 
515, 531 (1996) (gender classifications); City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 
432, 445–46 (1985) (denying heightened scrutiny for a classification of the mentally 
handicapped); see also Brown, supra note 1, at 1500–05 (discussing the Supreme Court’s 
approach toward “issues of unequal treatment on the basis of race or other group 
characteristics” and “protection of liberty”). 
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espousing the ideal arose in what are normatively unexpected and 
unattractive situations: equal protection arguments were used as 
often as a sword to sustain privilege as a shield against oppression. In 
our haste to distance ourselves from equality’s tragic past, however, 
we have lost something in the translation: we have lost an inchoate 
strand of thought which aimed, but failed, to articulate equality as 
more than formal classification, as a theory of governance. 
During the great heyday of what is known as laissez-faire 
constitutionalism,13 equal protection was often wielded by powerful 
corporations. By contrast, in the post–World War II world, equality is 
associated with powerless minorities. But law’s ideals are often used 
for purposes antithetical to its aspirations. The important point is not, 
then, the doctrine’s results; the point is its intellectual content and 
aspiration. For if this history is correct, equality once dealt with class14 
and governance in ways thought impossible by contemporary 
constitutionalists. 
The first thing to appreciate is that there was a history of equal 
protection from 1880 until 1937, even though so many 
 
 13. This term is not necessarily an accurate description. It was widely believed by the run-
of-the-mine scholar of the early twentieth century that the laissez-faire period was limited to the 
nineteenth century. Professor Charles Burdick, for example, wrote, 
Until the latter part of the nineteenth century the public mind was suspicious of 
governmental encroachment, hostile to governmental regulation, and bent upon the 
preservation of the largest possible degree of individual freedom. . . . [T]he opinions 
of the Supreme Court . . . have in recent years shown a change of emphasis, as a result 
of which the constitutional limitations upon state action have been liberally construed 
in favor of a wide power of governmental control. 
CHARLES K. BURDICK, THE LAW OF THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION: ITS ORIGIN AND 
DEVELOPMENT § 196, at 469 (1922). Scholars and historians know that the laissez-faire 
aspiration is one that each generation aims to reimagine. For the widespread presence of law 
and regulation in the nineteenth century, see generally WILLIAM J. NOVAK, THE PEOPLE’S 
WELFARE: LAW AND REGULATION IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY AMERICA (1996). Even 
students and seeming advocates of the Lochner era know that, until the 1920s, the Court 
consistently upheld regulation. See David E. Bernstein, Lochner’s Legacy’s Legacy, 82 TEX. L. 
REV. 1, 62–63 (2003) (recognizing that there were discontinuities in this period). 
 14. It is hornbook constitutional law that class or wealth is not a characteristic that triggers 
strict scrutiny. See, e.g., Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 374 (1996) (“[W]ealth discrimination alone 
[does not] provid[e] an adequate basis for invoking strict scrutiny . . . .” (first alteration added) 
(quoting San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 29 (1973))). In fact, the Court 
has struck down laws involving wealth discrimination in some contexts. See, e.g., Shapiro v. 
Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 638 (1969) (holding that a statutory prohibition of welfare benefits to 
residents of less than a year was unconstitutional); Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 18–19 (1956) 
(striking down legislation that denied indigents free trial transcripts); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 
U.S. 535, 541 (1942) (finding unconstitutional a statute that sterilized chicken thieves but not 
embezzlers). 
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constitutionalists have written that there is no history.15 In fact, one 
might argue that, during this period, equality was at least as 
doctrinally important, and controversial, as substantive due process.16 
To give one a rather crude empirical measure of this phenomenon, 
test the relative use of the term “equal protection” and that of the 
terms most conventionally associated with this period of law—“right 
to property” or “right to contract”—and one will actually come up 
with more references to equal protection. From 1900 through 1930—a 
period when equal protection is thought to have died in the Supreme 
Court—approximately 100 cases referred to “right to property” or 
“right to contract,” and 745 referred to “equal protection.”17 Indeed, 
close reading reveals that decisions now known for completely 
unrelated principles, including Lochner v. New York,18 Muller v. 
 
 15. See supra note 1 and accompanying text. 
 16. We recognize that, for some historians, the term “substantive due process” is 
anachronistic. It is true, as Professor G. Edward White has shown, that this term was not used 
during the Lochner period in the caselaw. G. Edward White, Revisiting Substantive Due Process 
and Holmes’s Lochner Dissent, 63 BROOK. L. REV. 87, 88–89 (1997). The absence of a particular 
term should not, however, obscure the fact that there was a good deal of discussion during this 
period about whether the Due Process Clause addressed not only “procedure but also . . . 
substantive law.” Robert P. Reeder, The Due Process Clauses and “the Substance of Individual 
Rights,” 58 U. PA. L. REV. & AM. L. REG. 191, 191 (1910). 
 17. LEXIS, U.S. Supreme Court Cases, Lawyers’ Edition, search between January 1, 1900, 
and December 31, 1930, with the terms “right to property” or “right to contract.” The disparity 
was not as extreme in the state courts. In the state court database for this same period, for 
example, 2,196 cases referred to “right to property” or “right to contract,” 1,371 referred to 
“class legislation,” and over three thousand referred to “equal protection.” LEXIS, State Court 
Cases, Combined, search between January 1, 1900, and December 31, 1930, with the terms: 
“right to property” and “right to contract”; “class legislation”; and “equal protection.” One 
caveat is important here: although the terms “right to property” and “right to contract” are the 
terms one uses today to view the Lochner period, these terms were not always expressed in this 
fashion, and so this set of numbers may undercount the number of cases that dealt with property 
or contract in some way. Our point is not to fetishize a particular number; it is to emphasize that 
equal protection was a far more common argument than is typically imagined. 
 18. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 54–55 (1905). Lochner has come to be known as a 
case about the right to liberty or contract, not equal protection, but was argued as a case about 
class legislation. For a sustained argument on the importance of class legislation to Lochner, see 
White, supra note 16, at 97. For the conventional account focusing on the right to contract, see 
Stewart Jay, The Creation of the First Amendment Right to Free Expression: From the Eighteenth 
Century to the Mid-Twentieth Century, 34 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 773, 824–25 (2008) (“This 
period was high noon for freedom of contract under the regime of Lochner v. New York.”); J. 
Harvie Wilkinson III, Toward One America: A Vision in Law, 83 N.Y.U. L. REV. 323, 325 
(2008) (“Lochner v. New York advanced the notion of a personal freedom of contract as part of 
the liberty protected by the Fourteenth Amendment.”).  
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Oregon,19 and Whitney v. California,20 were once argued at least in 
part as equal protection cases. 
To be sure, far more equal protection claims failed than 
succeeded, yet they were successful enough of the time that the 
arguments did not die. During the first decades of the twentieth 
century, two conflicting strands of thought informed equal protection. 
One strand we call the “textualist” strand, focusing on classification. 
Under the lingua franca of the police power, the courts affirmed the 
right, and indeed the necessity, of classification. Ultimately, this 
would become the core of modern equal protection law.21 
The other strand of equal protection, a strand called “class 
legislation,” was not limited to classification simpliciter. Legislative 
generality was its touchstone. The constitutionalist Justice Cooley, the 
intellectual patron saint of this doctrine, explained, 
[E]very one has a right to demand that he be governed by general 
rules . . . . Those who make the laws “are to govern by promulgated, 
established laws, not to be varied in particular cases, but to have one 
rule for rich and poor, for the favorite at court and the countryman 
at the plough.”22 
 
 19. Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412, 419 (1908). Muller is known for its use of the so-called 
Brandeis brief written by future Justice Louis Brandeis on actual labor conditions, not equal 
protection. See id. at 419 & n.1. 
 20. Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 369–70 (1927). The Whitney case upheld the 
application of California’s criminal syndicalism law to a member of the Communist Party. Id. at 
372. The case is most remembered for Justice Brandeis’s passionate defense of free speech in his 
concurring opinion: 
They [the Founders] believed that freedom to think as you will and to speak as you 
think are means indispensable to the discovery and spread of political truth; that 
without free speech and assembly discussion would be futile; that with them, 
discussion affords ordinarily adequate protection against the dissemination of noxious 
doctrine; that the greatest menace to freedom is an inert people; that public 
discussion is a political duty; and that this should be a fundamental principle of the 
American government. 
Id. at 375 (Brandeis, J., concurring). See generally Vincent Blasi, The First Amendment and the 
Ideal of Civil Courage: The Brandeis Opinion in Whitney v. California, 29 WM. & MARY L. 
REV. 653 (1988) (offering historical background on the Whitney case). 
 21. See Tussman & tenBroek, supra note 1, at 343. For a critique of this textualist strand of 
thought, see infra Part IV. 
 22. THOMAS M. COOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS WHICH 
REST UPON THE LEGISLATIVE POWER OF THE STATES OF THE AMERICAN UNION 559 (Boston, 
Little, Brown, & Co., 7th ed. 1903) (1868) (quotation error in original) (quoting JOHN LOCKE, 
TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 363 (Peter Laslett ed., Cambridge Univ. Press, rev. ed. 
1988) (1690)). 
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These arguments predated the Fourteenth Amendment and in 
part legitimated civil rights reforms. One of the more important post–
Civil War arguments against the Black Codes was that they created a 
special class of persons and thus violated the rule against class 
legislation.23 The idea lived on long past the Fourteenth Amendment. 
As University of Chicago Professor Ernst Freund would explain in 
1904, constitutional equality required a “general public law binding 
upon all the members of the community, and not partial or private 
laws affecting the rights of private individuals or classes of 
individuals.”24 
As a number of historians and legal commentators have shown, 
the class-legislation ideal emerging in the post–Civil War period had 
ancient roots.25 The colonists brought with them from England the 
notion of the “common” wealth, an idea aimed to resist the king’s 
grant of special favors and monopolies. John Locke’s Second Treatise, 
which was highly influential in America, declared that there should be 
“one Rule for Rich and Poor, for the Favourite at Court, and the 
Country Man at Plough.”26 Not surprisingly, new state constitutions 
incorporated these ideas, declaring that government was instituted 
“for the common benefit, protection and security of the people . . . 
and not for the particular emolument or advantage of any single man, 
family, or sett of men, who are a part only of that community.”27 
The idea lived on through the early Republic. Jeffersonian 
Republicans resisted the Federalists on the ground that they were 
granting legislative benefits to the few; the Jeffersonians made 
“‘equal rights for all, special privileges for none’ a central plank of 
 
 23. See WILLIAM E. NELSON, THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT: FROM POLITICAL 
PRINCIPLE TO JUDICIAL DOCTRINE 43–44 (1988) (reporting that Northerners objected to the 
Black Codes in part out of fear “that if the South were ‘reconstructed upon the principle that 
the rights of any class . . . depended upon race or color, we may well expect that the two 
opposite principles will produce constant agitation and struggle for supremacy, until it 
culminates in a resort to arms’” (internal quotation marks omitted)); Collins Denny, Jr., The 
Growth and Development of the Police Power of the State, 20 MICH. L. REV. 173, 189 (1921). 
 24. ERNST FREUND, THE POLICE POWER: PUBLIC POLICY AND CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS 
§ 611, at 633 (1904). 
 25. For documentation of this history, see HOWARD GILLMAN, THE CONSTITUTION 
BESIEGED: THE RISE AND DEMISE OF LOCHNER ERA POLICE POWERS JURISPRUDENCE 22–33 
(1993); NELSON, supra note 23, at 176–77; Saunders, supra note 7, at 255–58. 
 26. LOCKE, supra note 22, at 363. Justice Cooley would later use Locke’s phrase in his own 
treatise. See supra text accompanying note 22. 
 27. PA. CONST. of 1776, art. V (Decl. of Rights), reprinted in 8 SOURCES AND DOCUMENTS 
OF UNITED STATES CONSTITUTIONS 278 (William F. Swindler ed., 1979); see also, e.g., VT. 
CONST. of 1777, art. VI (adopting language identical to the Pennsylvania Constitution of 1776). 
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their platform.”28 This philosophy would reach its height at the 
creation of the modern Democratic Party, which was founded on 
Andrew Jackson’s insistence that government should “shower its 
favors alike on the high and the low, the rich and the poor.”29 The 
emergence of a legal doctrine reflecting these sentiments was one of 
“the chief constitutional development[s] of pre-Civil War America.”30 
As one editorialist explained in 1834, “[A]ll acts of partial 
legislation are undemocratic . . . and, in their final operation, build up 
a powerful aristocracy, and overthrow the whole frame of democratic 
government.”31 Relying on “law of the land” clauses in their state 
constitutions, state courts developed doctrinal rules striking down 
laws that were not “general and public” and that did not “operat[e] 
equally on every individual in the community.”32 As one court 
explained the rule of generality, “[T]he minority are safe, [if] the 
majority, who make the law, are operated on by it equally with the 
others.”33 The tradition would live on after the Civil War: as the 
Michigan Supreme Court would put it in 1870, “[t]he State can have 
no favorites,” for its business is “to give all the benefit of equal laws” 
 
 28. Michael Les Benedict, Laissez-Faire and Liberty: A Re-Evaluation of the Meaning and 
Origins of Laissez-Faire Constitutionalism, 3 LAW & HIST. REV. 293, 318 (1985). 
 29. Andrew Jackson, Veto Message (July 10, 1832), in 3 A COMPILATION OF THE 
MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS: 1789–1897, at 1139, 1153 (James D. Richardson 
ed., 1896). 
 30. Yudof, supra note 7, at 1375 (citing F.A. HAYEK, THE CONSTITUTION OF LIBERTY 188 
(1960)). 
 31. William Leggett, Editorial, Monopolies, N.Y. EVENING POST, Nov. 29, 1834, reprinted 
in 1 WILLIAM LEGGETT, A COLLECTION OF THE POLITICAL WRITINGS OF WILLIAM LEGGETT 
83, 85 (Theodore Sedgwick, Jr., ed., New York, Taylor & Dodd, 1840). See generally Alan 
Jones, Thomas M. Cooley and “Laissez-Faire Constitutionalism”: A Reconsideration, 53 J. AM. 
HIST. 751 (1967) (discussing Justice Cooley’s views on partial legislation). 
 32. Bank of the State v. Cooper, 10 Tenn. (2 Yer.) 599, 605 (1831). Other leading cases 
include: Regents v. Williams, 9 G. & J. 365, 412 (Md. 1838); Holden v. James, 11 Mass. (11 
Tyng) 396, 402 (1814); Wally’s Heirs v. Kennedy, 10 Tenn. (2 Yer.) 554, 555 (1831); Vanzant v. 
Waddel, 10 Tenn. (2 Yer.) 260, 270 (1829) (Catron, J., concurring); Ward v. Barnard, 1 Aik. 121, 
123 (Vt. 1825). For a discussion of the early cases, see RODNEY L. MOTT, DUE PROCESS OF 
LAW: A HISTORICAL AND ANALYTICAL TREATISE OF THE PRINCIPLES AND METHODS 
FOLLOWED BY THE COURTS IN THE APPLICATION OF THE CONCEPT OF THE “LAW OF THE 
LAND” 256–74 (1926). 
 33. Cooper, 10 Tenn. (2 Yer.) at 606; see also Ward, 1 Aik. at 123. In Ward, counsel argued, 
“If the legislature have power to select any individual, as the object of particular legislation, and 
exempt him from obligations to which all others are subject, it may be the instrument of the 
grossest favouritism; or, in times of political excitement, of the most cruel persecution.” Id. 
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and not “make discriminations in favor of one class against 
another.”34 
We call this the “governance” model of equal protection because 
it looks beyond anticlassification and antidiscrimination simpliciter 
and imagines unequal laws as violating fundamental governmental 
premises and democratic aspirations.35 The idea is not simply that the 
law has misclassified or used spurious generalizations (modern 
notions of equality); the idea is that general laws are superior to 
special ones because of what they do within the legislative process—
they link representatives to those they represent. Those who legislate 
generally find themselves the subjects of the law they impose and are 
far less likely to oppress when they risk the law’s application along 
with everyone else. If the many must legislate not only for themselves 
but also for the few, their fates are linked; special laws, on the other 
hand, raise the specter of aristocracy, a rule of the courtier over the 
countryman. 
Generality is in this sense an “embedded egalitarianism” (a form 
of “embedded constitutionalism”36) that aims to resist simultaneously 
the excesses of majorities and minorities by prophylactically aligning 
their interests in the legislative process. It may seem naïve or even 
fallacious to believe that a doctrinal standard could achieve such an 
effect, but what drove class legislation was an inchoate and often 
 
 34. People ex rel. Detroit & Howell R.R. Co. v. Twp. Bd., 20 Mich. 452, 486–87 (1870); see 
also, e.g., Ho Ah Kow v. Nunan, 12 F. Cas. 252, 255–57 (C.C.D. Cal. 1879) (striking down special 
legislation against aliens); Ex parte Westerfield, 55 Cal. 550, 551 (1880) (en banc) (striking down 
a Sunday law); Lombard v. Antioch Coll., 19 N.W. 367, 370 (Wis. 1884) (rejecting a class-
legislation argument); BRITTON A. HILL, LIBERTY AND LAW, OR, OUTLINES OF A NEW SYSTEM 
FOR THE ORGANIZATION AND ADMINISTRATION OF FEDERATIVE GOVERNMENT vi (St. Louis, 
G.I. Jones and Co., 2d rev. ed. 1880) (decrying the “tyrannies of money-power, of monopolies, 
and of class legislation”). 
 35. One might argue that both standards address governance. The principal distinction we 
are making here is between a standard that focuses on the textual virtues of logical symmetry 
and a standard that focuses outside the judiciary to concern itself with the legislature and with 
judicial-legislative interaction. 
 36. Embedded constitutionalism refers to a constitutionalism that is maintained not by 
judicial action but by institutions other than the courts. The term was first used, we believe, by 
Professors Joanne Scott and Jane Holder in their article Law and New Environmental 
Governance in the European Union. Joanne Scott & Jane Holder, Law and New Environmental 
Governance in the European Union, in LAW AND NEW GOVERNANCE IN THE EU AND THE US 
210, 238–39 (Gráinne de Búrca & Joanne Scott eds., 2006). Professor Anuj Desai has argued 
that the First Amendment sustained itself in early America because the post office adopted, in 
essence, First Amendment values, thus embedding the amendment within an institution other 
than the courts. Anuj C. Desai, Wiretapping Before the Wires: The Post Office and the Birth of 
Communications Privacy, 60 STAN. L. REV. 553, 557 (2008). 
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poorly expressed democratic theory—a theory which might be 
described as one of the “forced convergence” of majorities and 
minorities.37 To enunciate this theory is not, we emphasize, to suggest 
that it was successful as a judicial standard; indeed, the history of class 
legislation reflects equality’s use as a sword to protect privilege as 
much as a shield to reverse oppression. But before the idea can be 
evaluated, it must be remembered, which is where we now turn. 
A. The Equality Canon before Lochner 
Any understanding of the equality law of the early twentieth 
century must begin with a triad of late-nineteenth-century cases that 
formed a kind of canon38: Barbier v. Connolly,39 Yick Wo v. Hopkins,40 
and Holden v. Hardy.41 We consider each of these cases in turn to 
show the limits and purposes of the doctrine. 
Barbier announced the classic statement of the basic equal 
protection principle: “Class legislation, discriminating against some 
and favoring others, is prohibited, but legislation which, in carrying 
out a public purpose, is limited in its application” may withstand 
scrutiny.42 This statement merely summarized ideas that could be 
found littered throughout the pages of federal43 and, even more 
 
 37. See Derrick A. Bell, Jr., Comment, Brown v. Board of Education and the Interest-
Convergence Dilemma, 93 HARV. L. REV. 518, 523 (1980). 
 38. In the text, we have emphasized U.S. Supreme Court decisions, but as the footnotes 
demonstrate, the doctrine of class legislation was widely accepted throughout the United States 
in state courts. 
 39. Barbier v. Connolly, 113 U.S. 27 (1884). 
 40. Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886). 
 41. Holden v. Hardy, 169 U.S. 366 (1898). 
 42. Barbier, 113 U.S. at 32. 
 43. Many federal cases during this period invoked the class-legislation principle. E.g., Gulf, 
Colo. & Santa Fé Ry. Co. v. Ellis, 165 U.S. 150, 155–56 (1897) (“The differences which will 
support class legislation must be such as in the nature of things furnish a reasonable basis for 
separate laws and regulations.” (quoting State v. Loomis, 22 S.W. 350, 351 (Mo. 1893))); 
Marchant v. Pa. R.R. Co., 153 U.S. 380, 390 (1894) (citing and applying Barbier, 113 U.S. at 32); 
McPherson v. Blacker, 146 U.S. 1, 39 (1892) (describing class legislation as “[t]he inhibition that 
no State shall deprive any person within its jurisdiction of the equal protection of the laws” and 
explaining that it was “designed to prevent any person or class of persons from being singled out 
as a special subject for discriminating and hostile legislation”); Minneapolis & St. Louis Ry. Co. 
v. Beckwith, 129 U.S. 26, 29–30 (1889) (citing and applying Barbier, 113 U.S. at 32); Hayes v. 
Missouri, 120 U.S. 68, 72 (1887) (same); The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 24 (1883) (“What is 
called class legislation would belong to this category, and would be obnoxious to the 
prohibitions of the Fourteenth Amendment . . . .”). 
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insistently, state reporters.44 Justice Cooley’s treatise, Constitutional 
Limitations, was repeatedly cited as the source of this claim. “[E]very 
one has a right to demand that he be governed by general rules,” 
wrote Cooley: 
[A] special statute which, without his consent, singles his case out as 
one to be regulated by a different law from that which is applied in 
all similar cases, would not be legitimate legislation, but would be 
such an arbitrary mandate as is not within the province of free 
governments.45 
As one court explained, the “legislature has no right to deprive 
one class of persons of privileges allowed to other persons under like 
conditions”—the “law of the land” is a “general public law, binding 
upon all the members of the community.”46 “Class legislation, 
founded upon any distinctions of rank or wealth, is contrary to the 
genius of our institutions.”47 
The idea was to distinguish between legislation for the common 
benefit and legislation that benefited or burdened the few. The notion 
of common benefit and generality was more, however, than simply a 
 
 44. See, e.g., Hawkins v. Roberts & Son, 27 So. 327, 332 (Ala. 1899) (quoting Barbier, 113 
U.S. at 32); In re Morgan, 58 P. 1071, 1081–82 (Colo. 1899) (“The legislature has no right to 
deprive one class of persons of privileges allowed to other persons under like conditions.” 
(quoting Ritchie v. People, 40 N.E. 454, 456 (Ill. 1895))); Ritchie, 40 N.E. at 456 (“The ‘law of 
the land’ is ‘general public law, binding upon all the members of the community, under all 
circumstances, and not partial or private laws, affecting the rights of private individuals, or 
classes of individuals.’” (quoting Millett v. People, 7 N.E. 631, 633 (Ill. 1886))); State v. Haun, 59 
P. 340, 344 (Kan. 1899) (“The rights of every individual must stand or fall by the same rule of 
law . . . .” (quoting State v. Goodwill, 10 S.E. 285, 286 (W. Va. 1889))); Leavitt v. Canadian Pac. 
Ry. Co., 37 A. 886, 887–88 (Me. 1897) (quoting Barbier, 113 U.S. at 32); Messenger v. Teagan, 
64 N.W. 499, 501 (Mich. 1895) (same); People v. Bellett, 57 N.W. 1094, 1094 (Mich. 1894) (“By 
class legislation, we understand such legislation as denies rights to one which are accorded to 
others, or inflicts upon one individual a more severe penalty than is imposed upon another, in 
like case, offending.”); Low v. Rees Printing Co., 59 N.W. 362, 364 (Neb. 1894) (quoting 
COOLEY, supra note 22, on class legislation); Brim v. Jones, 39 P. 825, 826 (Utah 1895) (quoting 
Barbier, 113 U.S. at 32); Va. Dev. Co. v. Crozer Iron Co., 17 S.E. 806, 807–08 (Va. 1893) 
(rejecting a class-legislation challenge because Barbier allows class legislation that falls within 
the police power); Peel Splint Coal Co. v. State, 15 S.E. 1000, 1005 (W. Va. 1892) (“Class 
legislation, founded upon any distinctions of rank or wealth, is contrary to the genius of our 
institutions.”); Goodwill, 10 S.E. at 286 (“[C]lass legislation . . . [is] obnoxious to the 
prohibitions of the fourteenth amendment.” (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting The 
Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. at 24)); Bittenhaus v. Johnston, 66 N.W. 805, 806 (Wis. 1896) 
(quoting Barbier, 113 U.S. at 32); In re Garrabad, 54 N.W. 1104, 1106–07 (Wis. 1893) (same). 
 45. COOLEY, supra note 22, at 391–92. 
 46. Ritchie, 40 N.E. at 456 (quoting Millett, 7 N.E. at 633). 
 47. Peel Splint Coal Co., 15 S.E. at 1005. 
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question of textual classification or public value. It was an appeal to 
notions of reciprocity in governance: law’s generality was important, 
not simply in a formal sense, but because it forced lawmakers to stand 
in the shoes of those they represented. The principle of class 
legislation was terraced in both directions—it not only aimed to 
prevent class privilege but also invidious oppression: 
The rights of every individual must stand or fall by the same rule of 
law that governs every other member of the body politic under 
similar circumstances . . . . Were it otherwise, odious individuals or 
corporate bodies would be governed by one law, and the mass of the 
community, and those who make the law, by another.48 
Barbier v. Connolly may have been the case most cited for 
rejecting legislative class favoritism,49 but this was not because of its 
holding. The claim in Barbier was that San Franciscans were targeting 
the Chinese with an ordinance that prohibited nighttime laundering.50 
The claim failed because the Court found no discrimination: the law 
was “general” and did not apply only to the Chinese. 
A different result would soon appear in the next class-legislation 
decision, Yick Wo v. Hopkins. Yick Wo has come to stand for the 
proposition that a general law applied against a protected class may 
violate equal protection.51 In fact, the opinion was seen at the time as 
an application of Barbier’s class-legislation principle.52 The ordinance 
at issue in Yick Wo required laundry owners to obtain a permit from 
San Francisco’s board of supervisors but exempted laundries housed 
in brick or stone buildings from the permitting requirement.53 Unlike 
 
 48. Haun, 59 P. at 344 (quoting Goodwill, 10 S.E. at 286). 
 49. Barbier, 113 U.S. 27, was cited 175 times in state and federal courts before 1900; by 
1935, it had been cited over 900 times in state and federal courts. LEXIS, Federal and State 
Cases, Combined, search between January 1, 1884, and December 31, 1899, with the Barbier 
citation; and search between January 1, 1884, and December 31, 1934, with the Barbier citation. 
 50. Barbier, 113 U.S. at 29. 
 51. See 11 JAY HAKIM & STEVEN MINTZ, A HISTORY OF US: SOURCEBOOK AND INDEX 
172 (1999) (“This case established the principle that a law that appears to be racially neutral on 
the surface is unconstitutional if it is applied in a discriminatory manner.”). 
 52.  See, e.g., Dobbins v. Los Angeles, 195 U.S. 223, 240 (1904) (declaring that police power 
does not justify discrimination against a “class” and citing Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 
(1886)); BURDICK, supra note 13, § 279, at 593 (citing Yick Wo with Barbier and its classic 
statements against “class legislation”); JOHN S. WISE, A TREATISE ON AMERICAN CITIZENSHIP 
211–12 (1906) (citing Yick Wo with Barbier and stating that the case stood for the principle that 
“to deny to a class” equal protection violated the Fourteenth Amendment). 
 53. Yick Wo, 118 U.S. at 357. 
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in Barbier, however, there was evidence that the supervisors had 
applied the ordinance to favor some and disfavor others: 
No reason whatever, except the will of the supervisors, is assigned 
why they should not be permitted to carry on, in the accustomed 
manner, their harmless and useful occupation, on which they depend 
for a livelihood. And while this consent of the supervisors is 
withheld from them and from two hundred others who have also 
petitioned, all of whom happen to be Chinese subjects, eighty 
others, not Chinese subjects, are permitted to carry on the same 
business under similar conditions.54 
In practice, the law divided the “owners or occupiers into two 
classes . . . by an arbitrary line, on one side of which are those who are 
permitted to pursue their industry by the mere will and consent of the 
supervisors, and on the other those from whom that consent is 
withheld, at their mere will and pleasure.”55 It was the arbitrariness of 
the governing body’s (the supervisors’) decisionmaking (depriving 
people of work because they were Chinese subjects) that defeated the 
law under the class-legislation principle. 
Holden v. Hardy56 completes the triad. State courts were 
struggling mightily with whether regulations singling out particular 
employments could survive equal protection scrutiny. In the last 
decade of the nineteenth century, some state courts had struck down 
an odd assortment of laws on equal protection grounds, from laws 
aimed at regulating the payment of workers to those regulating the 
Sabbath to those regulating hours of work.57 In Holden, the question 
 
 54. Id. at 374. 
 55. Id. at 368. Although Barbier was much more frequently cited, Yick Wo was considered 
a class-legislation decision. See, e.g., Bailey, 219 U.S. at 223 (citing Yick Wo as a class-legislation 
case); Giles v. Harris, 189 U.S. 475, 478 (1903) (reprinting the statement of Wilford H. Smith, 
counsel for the appellant). 
 56. Holden v. Hardy, 169 U.S. 366 (1898). 
 57. See, e.g., Ex parte Jentzsch, 44 P. 803, 805 (Cal. 1896) (striking down a law barring 
barbers from working on Sundays as class legislation); In re Morgan, 58 P. 1071, 1072, 1084 
(Colo. 1899) (striking down a law that limited the workday of smelters and miners working in 
underground mines to eight hours as class legislation); In re Eight-Hour Law, 39 P. 328, 329 
(Colo. 1895) (per curiam) (striking down a law prohibiting mining and manufacturing 
companies from contracting with their employees for a workday longer than eight hours as 
“manifestly in violation of the constitutional inhibition against class legislation”); Eden v. 
People, 43 N.E. 1108, 1111 (Ill. 1896) (same); State v. Haun, 59 P. 340, 346 (Kan. 1899) (striking 
down a law that required workers to be paid in money rather than scrip for creating a class 
distinction); State v. Granneman, 33 S.W. 784, 785 (Mo. 1896) (striking down a law barring 
barbers from working on Sundays as class legislation); Low v. Rees Printing Co., 59 N.W. 362, 
368 (Neb. 1894) (striking down a law prohibiting mechanics, servants, and laborers—not 
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was whether Utah could limit the hours of workers in the mining 
industry.58 The case was argued both as a due process and an equal 
protection challenge.59 
In this, Holden was far from unusual. Although today equal 
protection and due process arguments are considered quite separate,60 
equal protection and due process once went hand-in-hand. Both were 
part of the police-power rhetoric of the day which held that the rights 
could be overcome by the state’s interest in health and safety—as 
long as the law was not arbitrary.61 Inequality was one possible 
manifestation of arbitrariness. As Professor Ernst Freund would put 
it in his treatise on police power, “[T]he two ideas [equal protection 
and due process] are closely associated in the minds of the courts” 
and, in fact in some cases, have been treated as almost the same 
thing.62 The class-legislation argument made in Holden was simple: 
the legislature had no power to single out one industry for regulation 
and to leave other industries unregulated.63 Doing so imposed a 
burden on one set of citizens not shared by others. Although such an 
argument might seem odd to a twenty-first century reader, it was 
successful in various state courts prior to Holden.64 
 
including farm or domestic laborers—from working more than eight hours per day). For a 
contemporary description of the case law in greater detail, see generally Henry R. Seager, The 
Attitude of American Courts Towards Restrictive Labor Laws, 19 POL. SCI. Q. 589 (1904). 
 58. Holden, 169 U.S. at 367. 
 59. Id. 
 60. See, e.g., Halbert v. Michigan, 545 U.S. 605, 610–11 (2005) (explaining the difference 
between the equal protection and due process concerns involved in the case). 
 61. See, e.g., Gundling v. Chicago, 177 U.S. 183, 188 (1900) (“Regulations respecting the 
pursuit of a lawful trade or business are of very frequent occurrence . . . and what such 
regulations shall be . . . are questions for the State to determine, and their determination comes 
within the . . . police power . . . unless the regulations are so utterly unreasonable and 
extravagant . . . that the property and personal rights of the citizen are unnecessarily, and in a 
manner wholly arbitrary, interfered with or destroyed without due process of law . . . .”). For 
other citations of this rule, see infra note 85. 
 62. FREUND, supra note 24, § 611, at 632. Indeed, this understanding lived on for quite 
some time. As Chief Justice Taft would later explain, in 1921, it was “customary” for the two 
arguments to be considered together. Truax v. Corrigan, 257 U.S. 312, 331–32 (1921). 
 63. Holden, 169 U.S. at 397–98. 
 64. In re Eight-Hour Law, 39 P. 328, 329 (Colo. 1895) (per curiam) (striking down a law 
prohibiting mining and manufacturing companies from contracting with their employees for a 
workday longer than eight hours as “manifestly in violation of the constitutional inhibition 
against class legislation”); Low v. Rees Printing Co., 59 N.W. 362, 368 (Neb. 1894) (striking 
down a law prohibiting mechanics, servants, and laborers—not including farm or domestic 
laborers—from working more than eight hours per day). 
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The Supreme Court in Holden recognized that, if this was what 
class legislation meant, then very few laws would survive equal 
protection scrutiny.65 Singling out could not be the sole measure of 
laws that violate equal protection because almost all law singles out, 
and it often singles out, not for reasons suggesting inequality, but 
simply out of the necessity of dealing with the particular needs or 
dangers of an industry. The Court upheld the regulation: under the 
police power, the state had the right to enact any law—even a law 
that interfered with existing rights—for the purposes of protecting the 
public health and safety.66 In Holden, the Court determined that 
protection of miners was protection of the public.67 Put in other 
words, the Court found that any statutory underinclusion served a 
public purpose; it was for the common benefit. That rationale was 
sufficient to defeat the class-legislation argument. 
Holden, however, did not defeat the efforts of big business to use 
equality doctrine to attack regulation. These efforts persisted in part 
because a number of Justices, not to mention lawyers, held onto the 
class-legislation idea. One can see this in a case decided a year after 
Holden—Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fé Railroad Co. v. Matthews.68 
Matthews involved a Kansas statute that changed common law 
negligence rules in cases in which a railroad caused fire damage.69 The 
railroad argued that it was being exempted from the common law 
rule: everyone except railroads was protected by the negligence 
requirement.70 Following Holden’s police-power analysis,71 the Court 
rejected the class-legislation claim.72 Special burdens were “often 
necessary for general benefits.”73 The railroad posed a special risk of 
fire,74 and regulating the railroad served the public good. 
Even as it upheld regulation and rejected the railroad’s equality 
argument, the Court insistently restated the class-legislation principle: 
“[T]he equal protection guaranteed by the Constitution forbids the 
legislature to select a person, natural or artificial, and impose upon 
 
 65. See Holden, 169 U.S. at 388. 
 66. Id. at 398. 
 67. Id. at 396–97. 
 68. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fé R.R. Co. v. Matthews, 174 U.S. 96 (1899). 
 69. See id. at 97. 
 70. See id. 
 71. Id. at 105. 
 72. Id. at 106. 
 73. Id. at 103–04. 
 74. Id. at 101. 
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him or it burdens and liabilities which are not cast upon others 
similarly situated. It cannot pick out one individual, or one 
corporation, and enact” rules not applicable to similarly situated 
persons.75 Citing Yick Wo v. Hopkins, the Matthews Court explained 
that, “[e]ven where the selection is not obviously unreasonable and 
arbitrary, if the discrimination is based upon matters which have no 
relation to the object sought to be accomplished, the same conclusion 
of unconstitutionality is affirmed.”76 The Court went on to explain 
that this analysis required it to move beyond the surface of the 
statute, noting that in Yick Wo v. Hopkins, the Court “looked beyond 
the mere letter of the ordinance to the condition of things as they 
existed in San Francisco, and saw that under the guise of regulation 
an arbitrary classification was intended and accomplished.”77 
The majority consistently restated the police power principle to 
persuade the four dissenting Justices, including Justice Harlan, who 
argued that the exemption from the common law rule was in fact a 
violation of equal protection.78 The dissenters relied on Gulf, 
Colorado & Santa Fé Railway v. Ellis,79 which involved a Texas 
statute permitting litigants to recover attorneys’ fees from a railroad 
when the railroad had lost a suit.80 The argument in Ellis was that the 
railroad was, in effect, being exempted from rules applicable to other 
debtors; that it did not enter “courts upon equal terms” with other 
debtors.81 Relying on Ellis, the dissenters in Matthews argued that the 
law exempting the railroad from common law rules violated the 
Equal Protection Clause.82 
Matthews reveals three central facets of class-legislation analysis: 
First, the rule tended to focus on arguments in which “singling out” 
existed on the surface of the statute—in other words, on exemptions.83 
 
 75. Id. at 104. 
 76. Id. at 105. 
 77. Id. 
 78. Id. at 110 (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
 79. Gulf, Colo. & Santa Fé Ry. v. Ellis, 165 U.S. 150 (1897). 
 80. Id. at 151–52. 
 81. Id. at 153. 
 82. Matthews, 174 U.S. at 110–11 (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
 83. The focus on exemption was part of the general understanding of “class legislation.” 
See, e.g., United States v. Sugar, 243 F. 423, 430 (E.D. Mich. 1917) (“It is therefore unnecessary 
to consider the questions whether such exemptions are such arbitrary discriminations as to 
render such statute class legislation . . . .”); Kendall v. People, 125 P. 586, 587 (Colo. 1912) 
(“[S]uch exemption rendered the act special or class legislation inhibited by the Constitution of 
Colorado . . . .”); Alpheus T. Mason, The Labor Clauses of the Clayton Act, 18 AM. POL. SCI. 
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Second, even if state courts found it initially a plausible way to strike 
down regulation, the United States Supreme Court tended to reject 
the argument. Contrary to common belief, far more regulation was 
actually upheld during the so-called laissez-faire period than was 
struck down84: rights during this period were in fact rather weaker 
protections than are thought because the state could rely on a strong 
police power argument.85 Third, the class-legislation principle was not 
 
REV. 489, 509 (1924) (“[T]he principle against class legislation would not permit [Congress] to 
give to laborers, or any other particular class, special exemptions under the antitrust laws.”). 
 84. A number of historical investigations have established this, beginning with that of 
Professor Charles Warren. See Charles Warren, The Progressiveness of the United States 
Supreme Court, 13 COLUM. L. REV. 294, 294–95 (1913); see also Ray A. Brown, Due Process of 
Law, Police Power, and the Supreme Court, 40 HARV. L. REV. 943, 944 (1927) (“[S]ince 1920 the 
Court has passed on [cases involving substantive legislation of a social or economic character] in 
fifty-three cases, and has held against the legislation in fifteen of them.”); Michael J. Phillips, 
The Progressiveness of the Lochner Court, 75 DENV. U. L. REV. 453, 454 (1998) (“[I]t is widely 
recognized that the old Court rejected more substantive due process challenges than it 
granted . . . .”); Melvin I. Urofsky, Myth and Reality: The Supreme Court and Protective 
Legislation in the Progressive Era, 1983 Y.B., SUPREME COURT HIST. SOC’Y 53, 69 (“In areas of 
maximum hours and minimum wages, employer liability and workmen’s compensation, and 
state child labor regulation, the Court during the Progressive era nearly always supported 
reform efforts.” (footnote omitted)); Charles Warren, A Bulwark to the State Police Power—
The United States Supreme Court, 13 COLUM. L. REV. 667, 669 (1913) (“‘Due process’ and the 
‘police power’ both being indefinite terms, the Court has exercised a wide discretion in 
enlarging the scope of both in favor of the State.”). These empirics are controversial on two 
grounds. First, numbers are not everything, and, as critics rightly claim, numbers do not reflect 
the degree to which a decision was legally or politically controversial and thus shed a negative 
shadow on legislatures or important public affairs. In fact, as one of us has argued elsewhere, 
the Supreme Court’s labor decisions were extremely controversial and had an enormous impact 
on the right to unionize and to strike. Victoria F. Nourse, A Tale of Two Lochners, 97 CAL. L. 
REV. (forthcoming 2009) (manuscript at 48–53, on file with the Duke Law Journal). Second, 
critics have urged that the numbers reflect a purely internalist, doctrinal view, which is 
historically misleading. See, e.g., Barry Friedman, The History of the Countermajoritarian 
Difficulty, Part Four: Law’s Politics, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 971, 1019 (2000) [hereinafter Friedman, 
History of the Countermajoritarian Difficulty] (noting public criticism of the doctrine). For a 
critique of the numbers, see Paul Kens, The Source of a Myth: Police Powers of the States and 
Laissez Faire Constitutionalism, 1900–1937, 35 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 70, 72 (1991). For the most 
balanced view of this period, see generally LAWRENCE FRIEDMAN, AMERICAN LAW IN THE 
20TH CENTURY 44–79 (2002) [hereinafter FRIEDMAN, AMERICAN LAW]. For clarification of the 
figure of “over two hundred” laws struck down, which appears in textbooks, see Nourse, supra 
(manuscript at 47–48). 
 85. Some of the more infamous cases of the 1920s tend to leave the impression that an 
absolute property or contract right existed. See, e.g., Adkins v. Children’s Hosp., 261 U.S. 525, 
546 (1923) (“[F]reedom of contract is, nevertheless, the general rule and restraint the 
exception . . . .”). But classic cases often leave a false impression of the general run-of-the-mine 
doctrine. At the time, the general rule was that rights, even personal rights, could be trumped by 
the common welfare. See, e.g., Schmidinger v. City of Chi., 226 U.S. 578, 587 (1913) (“The right 
of state legislatures or municipalities acting under state authority to regulate trades and callings 
in the exercise of the police power is too well settled to require any extended discussion.”); Chi., 
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only a principle of classification simpliciter, but carried with it 
inchoate, and sometimes changing, notions of governance.86 
B. Class Legislation and the Lochner Decision: 1900–1910 
The period from 1900 through 1910 is known as the Lochner era 
based on the infamous 1905 decision in Lochner v. New York. 
Lochner struck down a New York statute limiting the working hours 
of bakers. In the modern era, Lochner has been reviled as the 
quintessential example of the dangers of substantive due process, with 
all its “repulsive connotation of value-laden” judicial review.87 To 
emphasize the point, Lochner has been dubbed the twin of the most 
controversial decision of the end of the twentieth century,88 Roe v. 
Wade.89 The conventional view is that the Lochner Court originated 
substantive due process by creating the right to contract. In fact, as 
 
Burlington & Quincy R.R. Co. v. McGuire, 219 U.S. 549, 567 (1911) (“There is no absolute 
freedom to do as one wills or to contract as one chooses. The guaranty of liberty does not 
withdraw from legislative supervision . . . the making of contracts . . . . Liberty implies the 
absence of arbitrary restraint, not immunity from reasonable regulations and prohibitions 
imposed in the interests of the community.”); Williams v. Arkansas, 217 U.S. 79, 90 (1910) (“It 
is a principle which underlies every reasonable exercise of the police power that private rights 
must yield to the common welfare.” (quoting Williams v. State, 108 S.W. 838, 840 (Ark. 1908))); 
Manigault v. Springs, 199 U.S. 473, 480 (1905) (“[T]he police power, is an exercise of the 
sovereign right of the Government to protect the lives, health, morals, comfort and general 
welfare of the people, and is paramount to any rights under contracts between individuals.” 
(emphasis added)); Smith v. Command, 204 N.W. 140, 142 (Mich. 1925) (“[N]o citizen has any 
rights superior to the common welfare. Acting for the public good, the state, in the exercise of 
its police powers, may always impose reasonable restrictions upon the natural and constitutional 
rights of its citizens.”); see also NOURSE, supra note 5, at 16 (“Before World War II, what we 
now consider basic civil rights were often weak, easily overcome by the needs of the common 
welfare, then called the ‘police power.’”); Nourse, supra note 84 (manuscript at 2–3) (“[R]ights 
could be trumped easily by claims of the general welfare . . . .”). 
 86. See, e.g., Gilbert E. Brach, Is There Danger Ahead?, 6 MARQ. L. REV. 152, 155 (1921) 
(stating that when a body or group, such as laborers or farmers, combines to legislate its 
economic superiority, then “democracy is lost”); John F. Dillon, Property—Its Rights and 
Duties in Our Legal and Social Systems, Address Before the New York State Bar Association 
(Jan. 15, 1895), in 29 AM. L. REV. 161, 173 (1895) (“The one thing to be feared in our 
democratic republic, and therefore to be guarded against with sleepless vigilance, is class power 
and class legislation.”); Thomas R. Marshall, The Enemies of Free Government in America, 5 
B.U. L. REV. 153, 156 (1925) (arguing that class legislation and the “class idea” will destroy 
democracy). 
 87. Gunther, supra note 1, at 42; see also Aviam Soifer, The Paradox of Paternalism and 
Laissez-Faire Constitutionalism: United States Supreme Court, 1888–1921, 5 LAW & HIST. REV. 
249, 250 (1987) (“Lochner . . . is still shorthand in constitutional law for the worst sins of 
subjective judicial activism.”). 
 88. John Hart Ely, The Wages of Crying Wolf: A Comment on Roe v. Wade, 82 YALE L. J. 
920, 939–40 (1973). 
 89. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
NOURSE IN FINAL2.DOC 3/16/2009  3:18:09 PM 
2009] EQUAL PROTECTION 975 
historians know, this view is caricatured.90 Lochner did not invent a 
right in the modern sense of the term because the idea of right at the 
time was different from today’s concept of right-as-trump.91 Neither 
Lochner nor most other cases during this period used the term 
“substantive due process.”92 Lochner was argued, although not 
decided, as a class-legislation case (because the law applied only to 
bakers).93 
Whatever one’s position on Lochner and its claims of right, it 
should not diminish the argument we make here that equal protection 
arguments were alive and well at the turn of the twentieth century.94 
As Professor Ernst Freund put it in 1904, “The principle of equality is 
relied upon more and more to check the exercise of governmental 
powers.”95 Behind the focus on class legislation lay the great battles of 
labor and capital of the day; although Holden had upheld regulation 
of mines,96 doubts remained about whether that holding would apply 
elsewhere because state courts had reached contrary conclusions and 
because the Court’s own equivocation in Matthews suggested 
otherwise. By 1904, Freund would write that the Supreme Court had 
traditionally “leaned strongly against allowing the plea of a violation 
of the equal protection of the laws,” but “recent decisions show a 
tendency to subject statutory classification to a more rigid test.”97 He 
was referring to two cases: Cotting v. Kansas City Stock Yards98 and 
 
 90. See, e.g., GILLMAN, supra note 25, at 1; G. EDWARD WHITE, THE CONSTITUTION AND 
THE NEW DEAL 241–68 (2000). 
 91. Nourse, supra note 84 (manuscript at 2–3, 44–46). 
 92. White, supra note 16, at 87 n.2. 
 93. See id. at 93–103. Some believe that Lochner is in fact consistent with the class-
legislation tradition. See, e.g., GILLMAN, supra note 25, at 132. We believe that this claim is 
exaggerated. Lochner was a standard police-power case of the day. See Nourse, supra note 84 
(manuscript at 17–21); infra Part II.C. 
 94. In fact, the incidence of the term increased substantially from the last decade of the 
nineteenth to the first decade of the twentieth century. In the period from 1900 until 1910, the 
term “class legislation” appeared in federal and state court opinions 410 times, whereas the 
same search yielded 221 opinions in the period from 1890 through 1900. Those numbers likely 
underestimate the incidence of the doctrine as, in state courts, it often went by the name of 
“special legislation” as well. LEXIS, Federal and State Cases, Combined, searches between 
January 1, 1900, and December 31, 1910, and between January 1, 1890, and December 31, 1900, 
using the “opinion” segment to avoid “counsel” references, with the term “class legislation.” 
 95. FREUND, supra note 24, § 610, at 631. 
 96. Holden v. Hardy, 169 U.S. 366, 398 (1898). 
 97. FREUND, supra note 24, § 610, at 632. 
 98. Cotting v. Kan. City Stock Yards Co., 183 U.S. 79 (1901). 
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Connolly v. Union Sewer Pipe Co.99 In their day, both were more 
common citations than Lochner v. New York.100 
Cotting involved the regulation of stockyards.101 The Kansas City 
Stock Yards challenged the regulation on the ground that it was 
general in form only, applying to one business—the Kansas City 
yard.102 The majority found a violation of equal protection as well as 
due process (the stockyard’s property had been “taken”). Six Justices 
“assent[ed] to the judgment of reversal” on the ground that the 
statute applied “only to the Kansas City Stock Yards Company and 
not to other companies or corporations engaged in like business in 
Kansas, and thereby denie[d] to that company the equal protection of 
the laws.”103 
In retrospect, Cotting seems a rather odd case, but, at the time, 
the Supreme Court considered it of “profoundest significance.”104 The 
case raised fears that majorities would use regulations to target 
business unfairly, raising fears of an incipient socialism: 
Is it true in this country that one who . . . succeeds in building up a 
large and profitable business, becomes thereby a legitimate object of 
the legislative scalping knife? Having created the facilities which the 
many enjoy, can the many turn around and say, you are making too 
much out of those facilities, and you must divide with us your 
profits? We cannot shut our eyes to well-known facts.105 
Cotting’s fear of majorities contradicts contemporary 
constitutional sensibilities, which tend toward majoritarian deference. 
Yet it is difficult to deny that the theory of equality applied by the 
Court was based on an implicit political theory rather than a theory of 
formal classification. Fear of the “legislative scalping knife” was fear 
of improper governance—of majorities leading the country toward 
socialism and communism. To be sure, Cotting used equality as a 
shield against apparent legislative confiscation of property, not as a 
sword to fight social oppression. But whatever the result of the case, 
 
 99. Connolly v. Union Sewer Pipe Co., 184 U.S. 540 (1902). 
 100. From 1905 to 1930, Lochner was cited 264 times, Cotting was cited 343 times, and 
Connolly was cited 523 times. LEXIS, Federal and State Cases, Combined, search between 
January 1, 1905, and December 31, 1930, for the Lochner citation (“198 U.S. 45”), the Cotting 
citation (“183 U.S. 79”), and the Connolly citation (“184 U.S. 540”). 
 101. Cotting, 183 U.S. at 79–80. 
 102. Id. 
 103. Id. at 114–15. 
 104. Id. at 104. 
 105. Id. at 104–05. 
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the ideas implicit in the decision emphasized ancient equality 
doctrine, citing Judge Catron’s nineteenth-century decision in 
Vanzant v. Waddel106: “Every partial or private law, which directly 
proposes to destroy or affect individual rights . . . is unconstitutional 
and void. Were this otherwise, odious individuals and corporate 
bodies would be governed by one rule, and the mass of the 
community, who made the law, by another.”107 
If Cotting demonstrated that class legislation had not died in the 
twentieth century, so too did one of the most important equal 
protection decisions of that era—Connolly v. Union Sewer Pipe Co. 
Although Connolly has faded from memory, it addressed one of the 
most prominent issues of the day—antitrust. As Professor Owen Fiss 
has explained, an antitrust case was once the equivalent of a civil 
rights case, with antitrust symbolizing the progressive assault against 
concentrated economic power.108 An exemption once again triggered 
the equal protection claim: the law at issue in Connolly explicitly 
exempted farmers and laborers.109 
The Supreme Court reasoned that the exemption violated the 
Equal Protection Clause and struck down the statute in its entirety. 
The implicit argument was precisely the same as in Cotting: that the 
“exempted” majority in Kansas had legislated a burden on others 
while preferring themselves. As the Court explained, a group of 
farmers could conspire to set agricultural prices, and, under the 
statute, nothing could be done; only nonagricultural businesses were 
targeted for regulatory burdens.110 The Court viewed the exemption 
 
 106. Vanzant v. Waddel, 10 Tenn. (2 Yer.) 260 (1829). 
 107. Cotting, 183 U.S. at 105 (quoting Vanzant, 10 Tenn. (2 Yer.) at 270). 
 108. OWEN M. FISS, HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES: 
TROUBLED BEGINNINGS OF THE MODERN STATE, 1888–1910, at 158–65 (1993). 
 109. Connolly v. Union Sewer Pipe Co., 184 U.S. 540, 554 (1902) (“The provisions of this act 
shall not apply to agricultural products or live stock while in the hands of the producer or raiser.” 
(quoting 1893 Ill. Laws 182)). 
 110. The Court observed, 
We have seen that under that statute all except producers of agricultural commodities 
and raisers of live stock, who combine their capital, skill or acts for any of the 
purposes named in the act, may be punished as criminals, while agriculturalists and 
live stock raisers, in respect of their products or live stock in hand, are exempted from 
the operation of the statute, and may combine and do that which, if done by others, 
would be a crime against the State. 
Id. at 560. It concluded, “[W]e must hold that the legislature would not have entered upon or 
continued the policy indicated by the statute unless agriculturalists and live stock dealers were 
excluded from its operation and thereby protected from prosecution.” Id. at 565. 
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as problematic because it reflected a partial exercise of political 
power; farmers, predominant in the legislature, were self-dealing. 
With the passage of time, it is easy to characterize Connolly, like 
Cotting, as using equal protection as a sword to strike down business 
regulation in the service of a laissez-faire regime. For our purposes, 
however, the important point is the form, not the result, of the 
argument. The equality argument was not about classification 
simpliciter but about political favoritism. Although corporations no 
longer seem similarly situated to political minorities, this is precisely 
the implication of the Court’s opinions in Connolly and Cotting.111 The 
same class-legislation principle that aimed to secure the Chinese 
minority in Yick Wo was applied in Cotting and Connolly to protect a 
stockyard and a railroad on the theory that they were, in effect, 
politically disadvantaged minorities. This reflected embedded and 
often inarticulate fears, not of logic or classification, but of 
governance generally—that mob-like majorities would turn the 
country toward socialism or communism.112 The fear may have been 
exaggerated, but it was not a fear of classification alone, but a fear of 
governance. 
 
 111. See WHITE, supra note 90, at 246 (“One example of such tyranny or corruption was 
legislation that violated the ‘anti-class’ principle by failing to demonstrate that it was an 
appropriately ‘general’ use of the police powers, as distinguished from an inappropriately 
‘partial’ one. That type of legislation amounted to the favoring of one class or interest above 
another . . . .”). 
 112. The reference to communism and socialism was a common one. See, e.g., C.G. Haines, 
Note, Minimum Wage Act for District of Columbia Held Unconstitutional, 2 TEX. L. REV. 99, 
100–01 (1923) (“All such legislation has as its design to level inequalities of wealth, is socialistic 
in its trend, and leads to the dangers of bolshevism and revolution. ‘The tendency of the times,’ 
said [Justice Van Orsdel], ‘to socialize property rights under the subterfuge of police regulations 
is dangerous, and if continued will prove destructive to our free institutions.’” (quotation error 
in original) (emphasis added) (quoting Children’s Hosp. v. Adkins, 284 F. 613, 622 (D.C. Cir. 
1922))); see also Mountain Timber Co. v. Washington, 243 U.S. 219, 223 (1917) (reporting 
plaintiff’s counsel’s argument that “[t]he Fourteenth Amendment was adopted to preclude such 
philanthropic interference with the liberty of a self-reliant race. If the centralized advantages of 
communism or socialism are deemed preferable, the Constitution provides a method of 
amendment resulting in certainty of right” (emphasis added)); United States v. Joint Traffic 
Ass’n, 171 U.S. 505, 546 (1898) (reporting the solicitor general’s argument that “[u]ndoubtedly 
there is unrest, dissatisfaction, tendencies to anarchy and socialism, but these result not from 
competition, but the throttling of competition by trusts and combinations” (emphasis added)); 
Pollock v. Farmers’ Loan & Trust Co., 158 U.S. 601, 674 (1895) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (“It was 
said in argument that the passage of the statute imposing this income tax was an assault by the 
poor upon the rich, and by much eloquent speech this court has been urged to stand in the 
breach for the protection of the just rights of property against the advancing hosts of socialism.” 
(emphasis added)). 
NOURSE IN FINAL2.DOC 3/16/2009  3:18:09 PM 
2009] EQUAL PROTECTION 979 
Because of Cotting and Connolly, class legislation loomed large 
by the time the Court, in 1905, was asked to decide Lochner v. New 
York.113 Indeed, as historians have shown, Lochner’s innovation was 
its embrace of the right to contract rather than equal protection.114 
Lochner rejected the litigants’ class legislation argument. When 
Justice Holmes, in his Lochner dissent, wrote that the majority had 
relied on “an economic theory which a large part of the country does 
not entertain,”115 he was emphasizing what might have been clearer if 
the Court had emphasized class legislation and legislative favoritism. 
For Holmes, both class legislation and right to contract were 
reflections of laissez-faire ideology, which violated the first principle 
of judicial review: courts should defer to legislatures.116 
By the time Lochner was decided, the class-legislation doctrine 
was already showing itself to be a difficult line to follow. As Justice 
Holmes would eventually write, there had always been a strain of 
class-legislation rhetoric that appeared to equate the doctrine with 
textual classification, which was a purely formal doctrine, not one 
based on assumptions about legislative favoritism.117 Classification, 
 
 113. See supra notes 87–93 and accompanying text. 
 114. See, e.g., GILLMAN, supra note 25, at 128 (noting that the majority opinion did not 
“explicitly rely on the language of unequal, partial, or class legislation in striking down the New 
York act” but rather focused on the right to contract); White, supra note 16, at 100 (“The 
Court’s majority decision in Lochner . . . has been characterized as an example of judicial 
invocation of the doctrine of ‘liberty of contract’ . . . .”). 
 115. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 75 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting). Holmes’s famous 
reference to Herbert Spencer’s Social Statics, see id., was to a by-then outmoded political theory: 
the best state is the state that governs the least, see HERBERT SPENCER, SOCIAL STATICS: OR, 
THE CONDITIONS ESSENTIAL TO HUMAN HAPPINESS SPECIFIED, AND THE FIRST OF THEM 
DEVELOPED 321 (New York, D. Appleton & Co. 1850) (“Thus, if we regard government as a 
means of upholding the social state, we find that . . . there are several subsidiary ways in which 
the assumption of additional functions endangers the fulfilment [sic] of its original function.”). 
 116. On Holmes’s devotion to deference to legislatures, see FELIX FRANKFURTER, MR. 
JUSTICE HOLMES AND THE SUPREME COURT 31 (1938). 
 117. See, e.g., Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 208 (1927) (“[T]he law does all that is needed when 
it does all that it can, indicates a policy, applies it to all within the lines, and seeks to bring 
within the lines all similarly situated so far and so fast as its means allow.”); Dominion Hotel, 
Inc. v. Arizona, 249 U.S. 265, 268 (1919) (“The equal protection of the laws does not mean that 
all occupations that are called by the same name must be treated in the same way. . . . It may do 
what it can to prevent what is deemed an evil and stop short of those cases in which the harm to 
the few concerned is thought less important than the harm to the public that would ensue if the 
rule laid down were made mathematically exact.”); Keokee Consol. Coke Co. v. Taylor, 234 
U.S. 224, 227 (1914) (“[W]hile there are differences of opinion as to the degree and kind of 
discrimination permitted by the Fourteenth Amendment, it is established by repeated decisions 
that a statute aimed at what is deemed an evil, and hitting it presumably where experience 
shows it to be most felt, is not to be upset by thinking up and enumerating other instances to 
which it might have been applied equally well, so far as the court can see. That is for the 
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courts repeatedly insisted, was by its nature inequality; if legislation 
was to be pursued at all, it would have to be pursued unequally. 
Based on this rationale, and with the aid of the police-power 
justification, Cotting and Connolly turned out to be the exceptions 
that kept equality arguments going, even if they failed far more often 
than they succeeded. Equal protection arguments in the Supreme 
Court were, at the time, a dime a dozen, but they were easily met by 
claims—much like claims of personal right—that legislatures had the 
police power to regulate.118 
 
legislature to judge unless the case is very clear.”); Cent. Lumber Co. v. South Dakota, 226 U.S. 
157, 160–61 (1912) (“If a class is deemed to present a conspicuous example of what the 
legislature seeks to prevent, the Fourteenth Amendment allows it to be dealt with although 
otherwise and merely logically not distinguishable from others not embraced in the law.” (citing 
Carroll v. Greenwich Ins. Co., 199 U.S. 401, 411 (1905))). 
 118. A simple search for “equal protection” during this timeframe resulted in 275 cases. 
LEXIS, U.S. Supreme Court Cases, Lawyers’ Edition, search between January 1, 1900, and 
December 31, 1910, with the term “equal protection.” The results included numerous instances 
of the Court rejecting equal protection claims. E.g., Mobile, Jackson & Kan. City R.R. Co. v. 
Turnipseed, 219 U.S. 35, 40 (1910) (holding that a Mississippi statute abrogating the common 
law “fellow-servant rule as to ‘every [employee] of a railroad corporation’” did not violate equal 
protection and noting that the Court “has never . . . construed the limitation imposed by the 
Fourteenth Amendment upon the power of the State to legislate with reference to particular 
employments as to render ineffectual a general classification resting upon obvious principles of 
public policy because it may happen that the classification includes persons not subject to a 
uniform degree of danger” (quoting MISS. CODE of 1892, § 3559)); Griffith v. Connecticut, 218 
U.S. 563, 571 (1910) (holding that a statute exempting banks or trust companies and bona fide 
mortgages from a different statute prohibiting more than 15 percent interest on loans did not 
violate equal protection); Moffitt v. Kelly, 218 U.S. 400, 405–06 (1910) (holding that the Court 
did not have the power to review an equal protection challenge to a statute subjecting a wife’s 
inheritance to community property laws); District of Columbia v. Brooke, 214 U.S. 138, 152 
(1909) (holding that a law making resident owners of property criminally liable for failing to 
connect to the city sewer but assessing damages against the property of nonresident owners did 
not violate equal protection); Welch v. Swasey, 214 U.S. 91, 107–08 (1909) (holding that a 
Massachusetts law limiting the height of all buildings to 125 feet above the grade of the street, 
enacted under the police power, did not violate equal protection); Mobile, Jackson & Kan. City 
R.R. Co. v. Mississippi, 210 U.S. 187, 205 (1908) (rejecting an equal protection challenge to a 
statute requiring railroads to broaden and standardize a narrow-gauge road and stating “[t]hat it 
denies the companies the equal protection of the law, we may say, is without any foundation” 
and “[n]o discrimination against them is pointed out”); Thompson v. Kentucky, 209 U.S. 340, 
348 (1908) (holding that a law taxing distilled spirits in bonded warehouses did not violate equal 
protection); The Employers’ Liability Cases, 207 U.S. 463, 503–04 (1908) (rejecting a railroad’s 
equal protection challenge to a wrongful death statute); Atl. Coast Line R.R. Co. v. N.C. Corp. 
Comm’n, 206 U.S. 1, 25 (1907) (concluding that the North Carolina Corporation Commission’s 
order that a railroad restore a principal connection between the eastern and western parts of the 
state did not violate equal protection); Gatewood v. North Carolina, 203 U.S. 531, 542–43 (1906) 
(rejecting an argument that classifications in a North Carolina law prohibiting the operation of a 
“bucket shop” rendered the law unconstitutional); Nw. Nat’l Life Ins. Co. v. Riggs, 203 U.S. 243, 
255 (1906) (holding that a Missouri statute precluding life insurance companies, domestic or 
foreign, from asserting a defense based on the false and fraudulent statements in the application 
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C. Class Legislation and the Police Power: 1910–1920 
After Lochner, one might have thought equal protection would 
die. In fact, it lived on in both state and federal courts; citation to 
“class legislation” remained relatively steady during the next decade, 
1910–1920.119 As one Tennessee court said in 1911, 
We are of opinion that for this discrimination this act is arbitrary 
and vicious class legislation; that it denies all corporations doing 
business in Tennessee the equal protection of the laws, and is in 
contravention of the Constitution of this State and of that of the 
United States, and void.120 
Literally dozens, if not hundreds, of cases in the state courts of 
this period dealt with class legislation as an equal protection 
argument.121 Most frequently, these claims failed on the theory that 
 
did not violate equal protection); St. John v. New York, 201 U.S. 633, 636–37 (1906) (holding 
that a statute distinguishing between producing and nonproducing vendors of milk did not 
violate equal protection); McChord v. Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co., 183 U.S. 483, 495 (1902) 
(rejecting an argument that a Kentucky statute setting railroad rates violated equal protection); 
Murdock v. Ward, 178 U.S. 139, 147 (1900) (rejecting an allegation that an internal revenue tax 
violated equal protection). 
 119. References in federal and state opinions to “class legislation” from 1910 through 1920 
hovered at about four hundred, as they did from 1900 through 1910. LEXIS, Federal and State 
Cases, Combined, search between January 1, 1910, and December 31, 1920, and between 
January 1, 1900, and December 31, 1910, using the “opinion” segment to avoid “counsel” 
references, with the term “class legislation.” 
 120. State v. Nashville, C. & St. L. Ry. Co., 135 S.W. 773, 776 (Tenn. 1911). 
 121. See, e.g., State v. McGuire, 167 N.W. 592, 594 (Iowa 1918) (rejecting an argument that 
an Iowa statute made an unconstitutional distinction between owners of male horses and 
owners of bulls and boars offered for sale); Schulz v. Parker, 139 N.W. 173, 178–79 (Iowa 1912) 
(rejecting an argument that a statute prohibiting railway companies from giving free passes 
constituted class legislation); Hubbell v. Higgins, 126 N.W. 914, 916 (Iowa 1910) (rejecting an 
argument that a statute providing for inspection of hotels accommodating ten or more guests 
was unconstitutional class legislation and stating that “[c]lassification must be reasonable and 
based upon real differences in the situation, conditions, and tendencies of things” because “[i]f 
there is no real difference between persons, occupations, or property, the state cannot make one 
in favor of some persons over others”); McGuire v. Chi., B. & Q. R. Co., 108 N.W. 902, 906 
(Iowa 1906) (“That legislation imposing upon railway companies special restrictions, 
obligations, and liabilities not generally applicable to other persons or corporations is not a 
denial of the equal protection of the laws has been so often decided as to be no longer a 
debatable question.”); Mier v. Phillips Fuel Co., 107 N.W. 621, 625 (Iowa 1906) (“Nor do we 
think this statute open to the criticism that it is class legislation. Its object is the protection of 
landowners against subsurface encroachments. It extends to all who operate coal mines, at least, 
and protects all from whose land coal is taken without their consent. Such classification is 
uniformly upheld for not only all persons brought under its influence are treated alike under the 
same conditions but all are brought within its influence who are under the same conditions.”); 
Iowa Mut. Tornado Ins. Ass’n v. Gilbertson, 106 N.W. 153, 156 (Iowa 1906) (rejecting a class-
legislation argument); Gano v. Minneapolis & St. L. R. Co., 87 N.W. 714, 719 (Iowa 1901) 
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there was a general police-power justification for the statute. Those 
who hoped to resist regulation were often quickly disappointed, as in 
Payne v. Kansas,122 in which the Supreme Court upheld a law 
requiring those selling farm products to have a license.123 The Court 
summarily rejected the claim that the regulation was class legislation 
distinguishing between some farmers and others stating that there 
was a general reason for the law: “Manifestly, the purpose of the state 
was to prevent certain evils incident to the business of commission 
merchants in farm products by regulating it.”124 
As these claims became increasingly repetitive and easily 
resolved by the police power, they began to sound almost modern—
equating equality to classification simpliciter. Repeatedly, courts 
invoked the state’s “large discretion to classify.”125 As the Ninth 
 
(holding that a statute requiring railroad companies exercising the power of eminent domain to 
pay landowners reasonable attorneys’ fees incident to condemnation proceedings or appeals 
was not unconstitutional as class legislation because the burden imposed applied equally to all 
of a certain class exercising the power granted); State v. Garbroski, 82 N.W. 959, 960 (Iowa 
1900) (holding that a statute requiring certain peddlers to obtain a license was invalid and 
stating that “[t]he classification here attempted rests solely on a past and completed transaction, 
having no relation to the particular legislation enacted”); Rambo v. Larrabee, 73 P. 915, 918 
(Kan. 1903) (“It is entirely competent for the Legislature to adapt its laws, general in their 
nature, to general classifications either of individuals, surroundings, or conditions; but such 
classification must always be a natural one, not an arbitrary or fictitious one.”); State v. Smiley, 
69 P. 199, 208 (Kan. 1902) (rejecting a class-legislation argument); Criswell v. State, 94 A. 549, 
551 (Md. 1915) (holding that a statute requiring a license fee of individuals working as barbers 
at the time the statute was enacted was not unconstitutional); Groesbeck v. Detroit United Ry., 
177 N.W. 726, 737–38 (Mich. 1920) (rejecting a class-legislation argument over a strong dissent); 
Seamer v. Great N. Ry. Co., 172 N.W. 765, 770 (Minn. 1919) (“The constitutional prohibitions 
of class legislation are the same now as then. A marked change, however, has come in the view 
taken by the courts of the different states, and by the Supreme Court of the United States, and 
by our own, upon the question of what is a proper classification for legislative purposes. More 
and more the question is felt to be a legislative one which it is presumed the Legislature has 
rightly determined.”); Halsell v. Merchants’ Union Ins. Co., 62 So. 235, 236 (Miss. 1913) 
(“Stripped of details, and of its regulation, supervision, and license features, we find an effort to 
confer special immunities and privileges upon certain defined associations, engaged in the 
ordinary business of loaning money. This is to be accomplished by naming the preferred class 
building and loan associations. The law fixes the contractual limit of interest charges, and it was 
not within the power of the Legislature to exempt, by special act, the associations and 
corporations defined from the general law, under the guise of an artificial and purely imaginary 
special classification of the preferred class.”); Mo., K. & T. Ry. Co. v. Braddy, 135 S.W. 1059, 
1060 (Tex. Civ. App. 1911) (“[I]t is insisted that said article is unconstitutional because it is class 
legislation . . . . This assignment must be sustained.”). 
 122. Payne v. Kansas, 248 U.S. 112 (1918). 
 123. Id. at 113. 
 124. Id. 
 125. The leading case suggesting the state’s power to classify was Lindsley v. Natural 
Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61, 78 (1911) (“A classification having some reasonable basis does 
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Circuit explained in Johnston v. Kennecott Copper Corp.,126 in which 
the claim was that mining regulation was class legislation: “[t]he 
legislature possesses a wide scope of discretion in the exercise of its 
function of classification, and such legislation can be condemned as 
vicious only when it is without any reasonable basis, and therefore 
purely arbitrary.”127 This language reflects a general trend: courts 
would continue to state the basic principle of class legislation but 
would quickly limit it. As the Delaware Supreme Court put it: 
If such legislation amounts to class legislation as it is generally 
termed—that is, legislation that discriminates against some and 
favors others—it is prohibited by the amendment; but legislation, 
which in carrying out a public purpose is limited in its application, 
and within the sphere of its operation, affects alike all persons 
similarly situated, is not within the amendment.128 
If class-legislation cases typically failed, when did they succeed? 
The answer is that they were more likely to succeed when a strong 
liberty interest was at stake. This served to cabin equal protection—
equal protection did not cover all cases involving classification, only 
those in which something significant was at stake. It also had an 
implied, and inarticulate, political rationale: liberty provided a 
baseline from which deviation suggested abuse of legislative power.129 
As scholars have known for some time, without a common baseline, 
equality claims are largely empty, formal exercises.130 A strong liberty 
interest can provide not only a common baseline but also a warning 
sign for political malfunction. If liberty means those things that 
everyone in society shares, exemption from the shared baseline 
 
not offend [equal protection] . . . . [I]f any state of facts reasonably can be conceived that would 
sustain it, the existence of that state of facts at the time the law was enacted must be assumed.”). 
 126. Johnston v. Kennecott Copper Corp., 248 F. 407 (9th Cir. 1918). 
 127. Id. at 413. 
 128. Heffernan v. Chester-Cambridge Bank & Trust Co., 91 A. 385, 389 (Del. 1914). For 
similar state court cases during this period dealing with class-legislation arguments, see Leonard 
v. Am. Life & Annuity Co., 77 S.E. 41, 42 (Ga. 1913); State v. Horn, 152 P. 275, 276–79 (Idaho 
1915); Casparis Stone Co. v. Indus. Bd., 115 N.E. 822, 822–23 (Ill. 1917); People v. Gordon, 113 
N.E. 864, 865–70 (Ill. 1916). 
 129. BURDICK, supra note 13, § 279, at 593 (“It has been for the protection of civil rights 
that the equal protection clause has been resorted to . . . .”). 
 130. See Kenneth W. Simons, Equality as a Comparative Right, 65 B.U. L. REV. 387 passim 
(1985) [hereinafter Simons, Equality]; Kenneth W. Simons, The Logic of Egalitarian Norms, 80 
B.U. L. REV. 693 passim (2000) [hereinafter Simons, Egalitarian Norms]; Cass R. Sunstein, 
Lochner’s Legacy, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 873, 883–902 (1987); Peter Westen, The Empty Idea of 
Equality, 95 HARV. L. REV. 537 passim (1982). 
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suggests abuse of power—that the majority is dealing itself benefits or 
exempting itself from burdens imposed on others. As Professor 
Rebecca Brown has put it, when majorities take away important 
rights, they do not do it across the board but tend to do it to others.131 
The very importance of the underlying interest—in cases of this 
period, the right to work—signaled something that should be shared 
from which some were excluded. 
A typical case was Truax v. Raich,132 in which the Supreme Court 
struck down a statute that discriminated against aliens.133 Arizona had 
a law limiting how many aliens businesses could hire.134 In 1915, the 
Supreme Court struck it down, citing Yick Wo for the proposition 
that aliens were in fact protected under the Fourteenth 
Amendment.135 The loss of the right to work in the case was 
considered quite significant; this right was what the Fourteenth 
Amendment had been enacted to secure, insisted the Court, referring 
to the “free labor” ideology that influenced the passage of the 
Fourteenth Amendment.136 But the Court did not end there, as one 
might expect if the right to work were a right as rights are viewed 
today (as a stand-alone due process violation). Instead, the Court 
explained that this serious deprivation triggered strong fears of 
unequal protection: if the right to work “could be refused solely upon 
the ground of race or nationality, the prohibition of the denial to any 
person of the equal protection of the laws would be a barren form of 
words.”137 
Raich was an anomaly if one cares about results: during this 
period, as many scholars know, the Court’s civil rights decisions 
involving immigration and the rights of African Americans were, 
from contemporary perspectives, abysmal.138 What is less well known 
 
 131. Brown, supra note 1, at 1531. 
 132. Truax v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33 (1915). 
 133. Id. at 43. 
 134. Id. at 35. 
 135. Id. at 41. 
 136. On the influence of free-labor ideology, see generally NELSON, supra note 23, at 16; 
William E. Forbath, The Ambiguities of Free Labor: Labor and the Law in the Gilded Age, 1985 
WIS. L. REV. 767. 
 137. Raich, 239 U.S. at 41. 
 138. See, e.g., Gong Lum v. Rice, 275 U.S. 78, 86–87 (1927) (upholding a state’s power to 
exclude children of Chinese descent from white schools); Corrigan v. Buckley, 271 U.S. 323, 327, 
330 (1926) (upholding a racially restrictive covenant between individuals); Porterfield v. Webb, 
263 U.S. 225, 232–33 (1923) (upholding a California law denying aliens ineligible for citizenship 
the right to lease or own land); Terrace v. Thompson, 263 U.S. 197, 217 (1923) (upholding a 
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is that this substantive failure to protect was accompanied by 
repeated statements that race could not be used as a matter of 
classification. There is nothing new about the divide between law’s 
formality and its results; this gap yields scholars’ routine 
condemnation of the period as a tragedy of equality law. Only when 
there was a well-established claim of liberty139 did equality offer any 
protection for those who we would today call minorities. In Buchanan 
v. Warley,140 for example, the Supreme Court struck down de jure 
racial segregation in the sale of property.141 But the Court refused to 
intervene in education in Gong Lum v. Rice142 and Berea College v. 
Kentucky,143 because there was no similar claim of liberty and a 
pretense of equality (separate but equal).144 Curiously, these results 
existed alongside pronouncements in northern and southern state 
courts (not to mention the Supreme Court) embracing a rule of 
formal equality: in a period when lynching was still a significant 
practice, courts proclaimed, for example, that “color, race, nativity, 
religious opinions, political affiliations, or the like . . . do not bear any 
just, reasonable or proper relation to the subject of the legislation like 
that in question.”145 
In retrospect, one wants to know why class legislation did not do 
more in race cases. In fact, plaintiffs used equal protection arguments 
in some cases. Class legislation was argued in segregated 
transportation cases and in peonage cases146—but it failed. The first 
 
Washington law denying the aliens the right to own land unless they have declared “in good 
faith” their intent to become citizens of the United States); United States v. Bhagat Singh 
Thind, 261 U.S. 204, 207 (1923) (allowing Congress to restrict the naturalization process to 
“white persons”); Berea Coll. v. Kentucky, 211 U.S. 45, 51, 57–58 (1908) (upholding a state law 
prohibiting corporations from teaching black children and white children in the same 
institution); MICHAEL KLARMAN, FROM JIM CROW TO CIVIL RIGHTS: THE SUPREME COURT 
AND THE STRUGGLE FOR RACIAL EQUALITY 9 (2004) (“Scholars today tend to vilify the Court 
for its performance during this era.”). 
 139. See Raich, 239 U.S. at 41 (“[T]he right to work for a living in the common occupations 
of the community is of the very essence of the personal freedom and opportunity . . . .”). 
 140. Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60 (1917). 
 141. Id. at 82. 
 142. Gong Lum v. Rice, 275 U.S. 78 (1927). 
 143. Berea Coll. v. Kentucky, 211 U.S. 45 (1908). 
 144. Gong Lum, 275 U.S. at 85–86; Berea Coll., 211 U.S. at 54. 
 145. Wilson v. Edwards, 32 Pa. Super. 295, 305 (Super. Ct. 1907). 
 146. See, e.g., Bailey v. Alabama, 219 U.S. 219, 223 (1911) (argument for the United States) 
(peonage); Hall v. De Cuir, 95 U.S. 485, 508 (1877) (transportation); Bowie v. Birmingham Ry. 
& Elec. Co., 27 So. 1016, 1020 (Ala. 1900) (transportation); State v. Jenkins, 92 A. 773, 773 (Md. 
1914) (transportation); State v. Mo. Pac. R.R. Co., 147 S.W. 118, 120 (Mo. 1912) (peonage); 
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problem was formal equality—if the law addressed both races, if it 
was formally separate and equal—then no equality problem appeared 
at issue.147 The second problem was nature. Some courts held that 
natural classifications were not arbitrary,148 and, in a period in which 
the races were considered biologically distinct,149 classifications based 
on race were often considered classifications of nature. The third 
reason was the standard political theory of the day. The class-
legislation argument had a number of potential strains to it, but one 
of its great motivating impulses was the fear that legislatures had 
been captured by factions, whether majorities or minorities. Although 
a reader in 2009 is likely to see racial legislation as a classic example 
of factionalism, this was not the political theory of the day, which was 
driven by fears of socialism and communism, not apartheid.150 
D. Class Legislation Lives through the Taft Court: 1920–1930 
Equal protection claims declined, but did not disappear, in the 
period from 1920 until 1930.151 As Professor Charles Burdick 
explained in his constitutional law treatise in 1922, the “number of 
cases which . . . involved the right to classify under the police power 
[wa]s very great.”152 The concept appeared in some of the most 
controversial cases of the 1920s. Indeed, it figured prominently in 
Truax v. Corrigan,153 a case about one of the most hotly contested 
issues of the day—the labor injunction.154 The argument was framed in 
 
Chilton v. St. Louis & I. M. Ry. Co., 21 S.W. 457, 458–59 (Mo. 1893); State ex rel. Davis-Smith 
Co. v. Clausen, 117 P. 1101, 1114 (Wash. 1911) (peonage). 
 147. See, e.g., James F. Minor, Constitutionality of Segregation Ordinances, 18 VA. L. REG. 
561, 564, 571 (1912) (arguing that such ordinances were constitutional “provided the 
accommodations [we]re equal,” there was no “discrimination” and despite the principle that “all 
legislation which discriminates against any particular race or class of persons is in violation of 
the Constitution of the United States”). 
 148. See Tussman & tenBroek, supra note 1, at 346 n.13 (citing examples). 
 149. NOURSE, supra note 5, at 17–37. 
 150. See supra notes 111–12 and accompanying text. 
 151. In the period from 1920 through 1930, the term “class legislation” appeared in state and 
federal opinions 322 times, as compared to the five hundred times it appeared in the earlier 
decades, see supra note 94. LEXIS, Federal and State Cases, Combined, search between 
January 1, 1920, and December 31, 1930, using the “opinion” segment to avoid “counsel” 
references, with the term “class legislation.” 
 152. BURDICK, supra note 13, § 282, at 604. 
 153. Truax v. Corrigan, 257 U.S. 312 (1921). 
 154. Id. at 321–22; see also FELIX FRANKFURTER & NATHAN GREENE, THE LABOR 
INJUNCTION 154, 177–80 (1930) (detailing the labor dispute that lead to Corrigan and the 
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terms of an exemption: businesses sought to use the injunction power 
against strikers, but the strikers invoked a law exempting labor 
actions from the general equitable injunction power. 
Chief Justice Taft began by stating the by-then well-established 
rule that it was “customary” to consider the Due Process Clause and 
the Equal Protection Clause together, but then noted that the 
protections were not “coterminous.”155 The Due Process Clause, the 
Court said, meant that all people should have their day in court and 
“the benefit of the general law.”156 And, in this latter meaning, it 
tended to secure “equality” as a “minimum of protection for every 
one’s right of life, liberty and property.”157 “Our whole system of law 
is predicated on the general, fundamental principle of equality of 
application of the law. All men are equal before the law.”158 
This due process principle, however, the Court explained, was 
simply a minimum of protection for equality. The “specific guaranty” 
of equality was “aimed at undue favor and individual or class 
privilege, on the one hand, and at hostile discrimination or the 
oppression of inequality, on the other.”159 As in the past, this was tied 
to explicit exemptions and linked back to what has come to be known 
as a substantive right: 
Immunity granted to a class, however limited, having the effect to 
deprive another class, however limited, of a personal or property 
right, is just as clearly a denial of equal protection of the laws to the 
latter class as if the immunity were in favor of . . . a larger class.160 
The Court went on to cite Yick Wo for the proposition that laws 
were to be universal in their application “without regard to any 
differences of race, of color, or of nationality,”161 noting the 
“frequency with which” such principles had been invoked.162 
It would be left to Justice Holmes, in dissent, to illuminate the 
implicit political theory of the majority. Arguing against the majority, 
 
Court’s holding); FRIEDMAN, AMERICAN LAW, supra note 84, at 75–76 (“The labor injunction 
had terrorized organized labor for some forty years.”). 
 155. Corrigan, 257 U.S. at 332. 
 156. Id. 
 157. Id. 
 158. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 159. Id. at 332–33. 
 160. Id. at 333. 
 161. Id. (quoting Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 369 (1886)). 
 162. Id. at 334. 
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he identified and conceded their premise, that labor had “the 
ascendancy that the exception seems to indicate,”163 referring to 
labor’s power in the legislature to grant itself an exemption not 
granted to others. Having expressed the fear of labor’s ascendancy, 
Holmes rejected the argument on two grounds—one that did not 
meet the argument and one that did. The first was the by-then-routine 
claim of classification. Holmes’s Truax dissent opened with a well-
known discussion of the “dangers of a delusive exactness in the 
application of the Fourteenth Amendment.”164 By 1921, this was a 
standard reply to class-legislation arguments—but a reply that did not 
meet the objection. It assumed, instead, that class legislation implied 
precision of classification alone; to say that laws were difficult to write 
in precise ways said nothing about whether labor had obtained an 
unfair upper hand in the legislature, dealing themselves benefits 
denied others. 
In the end, Holmes simply rejected the political fears of the 
majority165: he insisted that the Court could not treat majorities as 
factions if there was a reasonable claim that they had acted in service 
of the public. If reasonable persons could support labor’s claims, then 
the Court had to treat them as a majority, not as a special interest, 
seeking to legislate themselves benefits. “If, as many intelligent 
people believe, there is more danger that the injunction will be 
abused in labor cases than elsewhere I can feel no doubt of the power 
of the legislature to deny it in such cases.”166 This embodies the police 
power–general purpose response to class legislation seen in Holden,167 
in Matthews,168 and in so many other cases: there was a reasonable 
basis for the classification, and that was it. 
Corrigan was one of the last significant cases involving class 
legislation, but it was not alone. Just as Yick Wo demonstrated, class 
legislation could provide benefits to minorities who were deprived of 
a right to work.169 This occurred as late as 1926 in Yu Cong Eng v. 
Trinidad (The Chinese Bookkeeping Cases).170 The Supreme Court 
ruled in favor of a Chinese merchant in the Philippine Islands, 
 
 163. Id. at 344 (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
 164. Id. at 342. 
 165. Id. at 344. 
 166. Id. at 343. 
 167. See supra notes 56–63 and accompanying text. 
 168. See supra notes 68–74 and accompanying text. 
 169. See supra notes 51–55 and accompanying text. 
 170. Yu Cong Eng v. Trinidad (The Chinese Bookkeeping Cases), 271 U.S. 500 (1926). 
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enjoining enforcement of an act making it a crime to keep business 
records in anything except English, Spanish, or any local dialect.171 
The ruling was based both on due process and equal protection. 
Quoting Holden v. Hardy, the Court summarized the issue: “The 
question in each case is whether the legislature had adopted the 
statute in exercise of a reasonable discretion, or whether its action be 
a mere excuse for an unjust discrimination, or the oppression, or 
spoliation of a particular class.”172 In its final, concluding paragraph, 
the Court invoked Truax v. Raich as an analogous case: 
As against the Chinese merchants of the Philippines, we think the 
present law, which deprives them of something indispensable to the 
carrying on of their business, and is obviously intended chiefly to 
affect them as distinguished from the rest of the community, is a 
denial to them of the equal protection of the laws.173 
Corrigan, Raich, and The Chinese Bookkeeping Cases were not 
the only cases that the Supreme Court heard and in which it struck 
down a classification as unjust discrimination during the 1920s. In 
Quaker City Cab Co. v. Pennsylvania174 the Supreme Court, over 
strong dissents, struck down a tax on taxicab services organized as 
corporations on the theory that exempting some taxicab services 
organized as individuals or partnerships was arbitrary.175 In Power 
Manufacturing Co. v. Saunders,176 the Court struck down venue 
provisions allowing a corporation to be sued in a county where it did 
no business on the theory that the statute discriminated against 
foreign corporations.177 In Kansas City Southern Railway Co. v. Road 
Improvement District No. 6,178 the Court concluded that a property-
assessment law discriminated in a “palpable” manner because it did 
not treat “railroad companies . . . like individual owners.”179 There was 
 
 171. Id. at 508, 524–25. 
 172. Id. at 526 (quoting Holden v. Hardy, 169 U.S. 366, 398 (1898)). 
 173. Id. at 527–28. 
 174. Quaker City Cab Co. v. Pennsylvania, 277 U.S. 389 (1928). 
 175. Id. at 402 (“In effect § 23 divides those operating taxicabs into two classes. The gross 
receipts of incorporated operators are taxed, while those of natural persons and partnerships 
carrying on the same business are not. . . . The tax is imposed merely because the owner is a 
corporation.”). 
 176. Power Mfg. Co. v. Saunders, 274 U.S. 490 (1927). 
 177. Id. at 494 (“So we conclude that the special classification and discriminatory treatment 
of foreign corporations are without reasonable basis and essentially arbitrary.”). 
 178. Kan. City S. Ry. Co. v. Rd. Improvement Dist. No. 6, 256 U.S. 658 (1921). 
 179. Id. at 661. 
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even an occasional case on racial discrimination: in Nixon v. 
Herndon,180 the Court struck down the Texas white-primary law under 
the Fourteenth Amendment in ringing praise that reality mocked: 
[T]he law in the States shall be the same for the black as for the 
white: that all persons, whether colored or white, shall stand equal 
before the laws of the States, and, in regard to the colored race, for 
whose protection the amendment was primarily designed, that no 
discrimination shall be made against them by law because of their 
color.181 
In this era, as was true of earlier eras, far more of these 
challenges were rejected than affirmed. In a vast number of cases, 
corporations, associations, and individuals claimed that rules and 
regulations violated their equal protection rights.182 There were cases, 
 
 180. Nixon v. Herndon, 273 U.S. 536 (1927). 
 181. Id. at 541 (quoting Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60, 77 (1917)). 
 182. This was true of cases in the federal courts. See, e.g., Herbring v. Lee, 280 U.S. 111, 116 
(1929) (reporting the petitioner’s argument that a licensing requirement violated “class 
legislation”); Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 370–71 (1927) (rejecting the petitioner’s 
argument that a criminal syndicalism statute was “class legislation”); Twohy Bros. Co. v. 
Kennedy, 295 F. 462, 465–67 (9th Cir. 1924) (rejecting a claim that a law holding an employer 
liable for injuries arising from conditions of a hazardous occupation violated equal protection); 
Berlet v. Lehigh Valley Silk Mills, 287 F. 769, 771 (3d Cir. 1923) (affirming the state supreme 
court’s decision that a law giving a lien to “throwsters” of silk on silk thrown, retained, and 
returned was class legislation); C. A. Weed & Co. v. Lockwood, 266 F. 785, 791–94 (2d Cir. 
1920) (involving a challenge to the Lever Act as unconstitutional “class legislation”); Gloucester 
Seafood Workers’ Ass’n v. Houston, 35 F.2d 193, 196 (E.D. Va. 1929) (rejecting a class-
legislation argument); Liberty Highway Co. v. Mich. Pub. Utils. Comm’n, 294 F. 703, 709 (E.D. 
Mich. 1923) (rejecting a class-legislation argument attacking regulation of common carriers). 
This was true as well in the state courts. See, e.g., Franchise Motor Freight Ass’n v. Seavey, 235 
P. 1000, 1003–04 (Cal. 1925) (upholding a class-legislation challenge to regulatory exemption); 
Ex parte Rameriz, 226 P. 914, 920 (Cal. 1924) (rejecting a class-legislation challenge to excluding 
aliens from gun ownership); Montgomery v. Town of Branford, 147 A. 9, 10–11 (Conn. 1929) 
(striking down a tax as violating the rule of equal protection and class legislation); Territory v. 
Armstrong, 28 Haw. 88, 93–97 (1924) (rejecting an argument that an adultery statute violated 
class legislation and equal protection because it treated men and women differently); Ex parte 
Bottjer, 260 P. 1095, 1096 (Idaho 1927) (rejecting an argument that a statute applying only to 
bankers was improper class legislation); Smallwood v. Jeter, 244 P. 149, 155 (Idaho 1926) 
(rejecting a challenge that exempting school buses violates class legislation); People v. Sheldon, 
152 N.E. 567, 568–69 (Ill. 1926) (rejecting a class-legislation challenge to a concealed-weapon 
law); Fountain Park Co. v. Hensler, 155 N.E. 465, 468 (Ind. 1927) (striking down a statute that 
granted eminent domain power to a religious entity as improper class legislation); City of 
Springfield v. Smith, 19 S.W.2d 1, 7 (Mo. 1929) (striking down a statute barring the showing of 
motion pictures on Sundays as class legislation); City of Seattle v. Gervasi, 258 P. 328, 332 
(Wash. 1927) (rejecting an argument that a statute that barred selling groceries on Sunday was 
class legislation). 
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like Terrace v. Thompson,183 in which the Court seemed to defy its 
protection of aliens in Raich, ruling in favor of California’s racist bans 
on Japanese land ownership (on the theory that the discrimination 
was supported by the police power, the potential harm being land 
ownership by noncitizens).184 Indeed, there are cases that we today 
find inhumane, such as Buck v. Bell, in which the Supreme Court in 
1927 upheld forced sterilization and rejected equal protection with 
the back of its hand185—even though equality was the best argument 
available against the sterilization statute and had influenced a number 
of state supreme courts to strike down such laws.186 In Buck, Justice 
Holmes who was openly disdainful of a priori claims of right and 
equality, issued the famous line that equality was the “usual last 
resort” of constitutional lawyers,187 not because there were no equality 
cases, but because there were too many.188 
II.  HISTORICAL IMPLICATIONS 
The legal history of judicial doctrine is always subject to the 
historian’s skeptical nostrum that it is “law-office history.” But this is 
not the standard history of doctrine; it is the history of the average 
legal consciousness of the day, rather than the “leading” controversial 
case that colors the lenses of the practicing constitutionalist solving 
twenty-first-century problems. This history disrupts conventional 
scholarly wisdom that equal protection fell into “desuetude” for 
eighty years,189 when in fact there were a surfeit of cases. As the great 
historian of science, Professor Thomas Kuhn, once admonished his 
students, it is precisely when the incomprehensible rears its head that 
time reveals how much has been forgotten.190 It is only because of the 
 
 183. Terrace v. Thompson, 263 U.S. 197 (1923). 
 184. Id. at 217. 
 185. Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 208 (1927). 
 186. NOURSE, supra note 5, at 28, 185 nn.35–36; Stephen A. Siegel, Justice Holmes, Buck v. 
Bell, and the History of Equal Protection, 90 MINN. L. REV. 106, 108, 124–31 (2005). 
 187. Buck, 274 U.S. at 208. 
 188. See supra notes 17, 94 and 118. 
 189. Tussmann & tenBroek, supra note 1, at 341. 
 190. See THOMAS S. KUHN, THE ESSENTIAL TENSION: SELECTED STUDIES IN SCIENTIFIC 
TRADITION AND CHANGE xii (1977) (“When reading the works of an important thinker, look 
first for the apparent absurdities in the text and ask yourself how a sensible person could have 
written them. When you find an answer, . . . when those passages make sense, then you may find 
that more central passages, ones you previously thought you understood, have changed their 
meaning.”). 
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relentless presentism191 of legal practice, which requires looking for 
cases with modern fact patterns (of race and sex and disability), that 
lawyers and scholars forget that different equality cases once existed. 
As the United States’ leading historiographer of law, Professor 
Bob Gordon, has explained, lawyers tend to “treat the past as existing 
on a timeless horizontal plane with the present: Past texts and 
practices are to be read exactly in their times as they are in 
ours . . . .”192 This demands indifference to the past as well as the 
present; as Professor Reva Siegel urges, the past preserves itself 
through transformation.193 We believe this operates as well in reverse: 
the present preserves itself in the past by recasting the past in its own 
image. Legal institutions cover and even erase the past to increase the 
authority of their pronouncements, to render law timeless and 
transcendent. One is tempted to think this is all a problem of the 
normative cast of legal scholarship, but we believe this phenomenon 
is structured presentism—a presentism demanded by and embedded 
within the system of precedent that requires that one find, in the past, 
words that quite literally precede themselves. 
 
 191. Presentism, as used by historians, refers to the tendency to look at the past through 
contemporary eyes: for example, judging Henry Ford’s Model T by the standards of modern 
300-horsepower engines. As Professor Larry Kramer has quipped, no historical effort is ever 
immune from presentism. Larry Kramer, Response, 81 CHI.-KENT. L. REV. 1173, 1174 (2006) 
(“Historians are all and always presentist.”). Yet, if a certain presentism is inevitable, historians 
are at least trained to be conscious of their own temporal biases; lawyers are trained to be 
oblivious to their temporal biases. The very structure of precedent makes presentism far more 
insistent for lawyers than for historians. Lawyers are taught to read cases as if they had no time, 
as if the words of 1861 could be immediately translated into the words of 1961. There are virtues 
to this, but there are also vices, and the vices include a structured forgetting of concepts that 
have no analogue in the present. It is precisely because judicial review is so taken for granted, 
for example, that no one would have thought, before Kramer’s book, that the “people 
themselves” might have exercised this power. Resisting presentism in this sense can enable law 
to engage in discovery, asking new questions that the present cannot think to ask. See LARRY 
KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES: POPULAR CONSTITUTIONALISM AND JUDICIAL REVIEW 
8 (2004) (noting that “final interpretive authority rested with ‘the people themselves’” and 
surmising that by studying this period of popular constitutionalism, “we may find some reasons 
to reawaken our own seemingly deadened sensibilities in this respect”). 
 192. Robert W. Gordon, Foreword: The Arrival of Critical Historicism, 49 STAN. L. REV. 
1023, 1023 (1997). 
 193. We see the move here as bidirectional. Doctrinal change tends to preserve the past, as 
Professor Siegel has so compellingly documented. Reva Siegel, Why Equal Protection No 
Longer Protects: The Evolving Forms of Status-Enforcing State Action, 49 STAN. L. REV. 1111, 
1113 (1997). But doctrine and precedent also tend to preserve the present in the past, tending to 
take present controversies and transforming them into past ones, even if the past is radically 
different. See Nourse, supra note 84 (manuscript at 3). 
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The history of class legislation is important for a number of 
scholarly controversies precisely because it disrupts the present’s 
conventional wisdom of equality law’s history. And, disrupting that 
history, it offers new insights about old debates. First, as we show, this 
history suggests that the most important scholarly contributions to 
modern equal protection law—such as the underinclusive and 
overinclusive rules of logical classification suggested by Professors 
Tussman and tenBroek’s 1949 article194—depend on a false history. 
Equality law has not always been about classification simpliciter, as 
opposed to classification as a signal of some greater principle of 
governance. Second, this history corrects the record on recent 
historical debates: some have used the history of equality law, and in 
particular class legislation, to support a new revisionist history of 
substantive due process. If our history is correct, this effort has been 
misdirected and is based on a fundamental doctrinal confusion 
between equal protection and due process. Third, this history sees 
continuities where most assume discontinuity. Equality aspired to 
political theory long before Professor John Hart Ely, United States v. 
Carolene Products Co.,195 and public choice theory;196 since the 
Founding, equality has imbibed and reflected political theory 
(whether good, bad, or incoherent). Fourth, this history implies 
misdirection: the endless debates about the intentions of the framers 
of the Fourteenth Amendment may be misguided if equality is 
grounded in basic notions of governance predating the amendment. 
 
 194. Tussman & tenBroek, supra note 1; see also infra notes 198–205. 
 195. United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144 (1938). 
 196. Professor John Hart Ely is considered the author of a political-process theory of 
constitutional review that seeks to justify the use of judicial review to reinforce the 
representation of minorities. See JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF 
JUDICIAL REVIEW 87–88 (1980) (summarizing “three arguments in favor of a participation-
oriented, representation-reinforcing approach to judicial review”). Carolene Products, 304 U.S. 
144 (1938), set forth an early version of this view in the most famous footnote in constitutional 
law, which states that the Court may exercise greater powers of review when minorities do not 
have sufficient political power to make their views effective in the political process, id. at 153 
n.4. Some constitutionalists, such as Professor Geoffrey Miller, have argued that class legislation 
reflected an early version of modern public choice theory, which posits that government exists 
to benefit special interests. E.g., Geoffrey P. Miller, Public Choice at the Dawn of the Special 
Interest State: The Story of Butter and Margarine, 77 CAL. L. REV. 83, 85, 124–26, 127 n.277 
(1989). 
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A. Equality as a Matter of Classification 
One of the great tropes of equality law is that equality is a matter 
of classification and that legislatures have a large discretion in 
classification generally.197 This implies a particular idea of equality as 
a matter of logic and language. This ideal was substantially reinforced 
by one of the most important articles on equal protection written in 
the twentieth century, Professors Tussman and tenBroek’s 1949 
article, The Equal Protection of the Laws. The basic concepts found in 
that article—of under- and overinclusive categories, of substantive 
equal protection, and forbidden or “suspect” classification—became 
the heart of equal protection analysis in the last half of the twentieth 
century.198 
Professors Tussman and tenBroek reimagined equal protection 
law as a question of “fit” between the statute’s purpose and its 
categories, offering what appeared a more sophisticated way to 
analyze statutory classifications (under- or overexclusion) and one 
that incorporated the legal process theories of the day that focused on 
the “purpose” of statutes.199 And, yet, their account almost completely 
obscured the history we have recounted. The authors open with the 
claim we have shown to be false, that the Equal Protection Clause 
had, for eighty years fallen into “relative desuetude.”200 At one point, 
the authors advert to “special” or class legislation but misstate the 
doctrine as one of “reasonable classification”; from there they move 
to a very modern idea, defining reasonableness as “the degree of [the 
statute’s] success in treating similarly those similarly situated.”201 
By offering a method (analysis of classifications) for equal 
protection cases, Professors Tussman and tenBroek obscured the 
inchoate, often conflicting, but nevertheless real attempts by courts to 
imbue equal protection with political theory. In place of links 
between majorities and minorities or oppressed and privileged 
minorities, Tussman and tenBroek gave scholars diagrams of traits 
and mischiefs.202 In the place of liberty as a baseline from which 
exemptions seemed suspect was the notion that substantive equality 
 
 197. See generally John Marquez Lundin, Making Equal Protection Analysis Make Sense, 49 
SYRACUSE L. REV. 1191 (1999) (tracing the history of equal protection). 
 198. Tussman & tenBroek, supra note 1, at 356. 
 199. Id. at 346–48. 
 200. Id. at 341. 
 201. Id. at 343–44. 
 202. See id. at 347 (diagrams). 
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was the “equality” version of the by-then highly discredited, 
substantive due process.203 In the place of the fears of aristocracy or 
socialism, which once appeared near the surface of judicial opinions 
on equal protection,204 came a diagnostic tool of seemingly great 
power aspiring to logical purity.205 If our history is right, not only did 
Tussman and tenBroek recount a partial history, but they also missed 
the very importance of equal protection: its aspirations to political 
theory rather than formal classification. 
B. Class Legislation as Political Theory 
If this history takes equal protection out of the shadows of 
modern fixations on classificatory logic, it also reveals something 
important about the history of equality law. Equality has always 
aspired to something larger than a logical system of classification. 
Long before Carolene Products, long before Professor John Hart Ely, 
courts and commentators worried about legislatures’ tendencies to 
deal out benefits to their friends and burdens to their enemies.206 In 
this sense, class legislation is the oddly architectured precursor to the 
political process theories of the late-twentieth century, whether 
theories of public choice or representation reinforcement. As 
Professor Michael Klarman has noted, political-process theories have 
been extraordinarily resilient.207 What many have failed to appreciate 
is just how old they might be; indeed, they are prefigured in the 
doctrine of class legislation. 
In hindsight, class legislation joined two otherwise potentially 
incompatible political prescriptions. On the one hand, it attempted to 
protect minorities from majorities, as in Yick Wo v. Hopkins or Truax 
v. Raich. This was a kind of antiaristocracy rule. On the other hand, 
courts saw no difference between deploying this concept as a sword 
 
 203. Id. at 361–65. 
 204. See supra note 112. 
 205. Professors Tussman and tenBroek recognize at one point that there was a “theory of 
legislation and the state” at stake in equal protection but explicitly reject what they called “the 
pressure group theory,” urging that this theory was incompatible with equal protection. 
Tussman & tenBroek, supra note 1, at 350. One (although not the only) way of reading this 
otherwise opaque passage is that the authors were rejecting the use of equal protection to police 
the legislature against capture by concentrated interests. In short, to the extent that the authors 
recognized that larger claims were at issue, they rejected them. 
 206. See supra notes 22–34 and accompanying text. 
 207. See generally Michael J. Klarman, The Puzzling Resistance to Political Process Theory, 
77 VA. L. REV. 747, 830 (1991) (“[P]olitical process theory is the only promising constitutional 
theory on the table . . . . ”). 
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against racial oppression and as a shield from business regulation. 
Class legislation helped to strike down at least some discriminations 
against minorities, but it also helped strike down laws that came to be 
associated with majorities. Some scholars dispute this, arguing that 
class legislation reflected a proto–public choice doctrine designed to 
prevent groups from legislating themselves monopolies, based on the 
assumption that most legislation is inefficient and therefore rent 
seeking.208 But if one is in the business of picking future analogues, it 
is just as likely that class legislation was a precursor, in cases like Yick 
Wo, Raich, or The Chinese Bookkeeping Cases, to cases in which the 
Court limited its legislative supervision to monopolistic practices 
affecting insular minorities. In this latter sense, the doctrine can be 
seen as an early signal of what would flower in Carolene Products. 
To be sure, analogizing class legislation to modern political 
theories poses risks of presentism. The very idea of class legislation, 
both in the doctrinal and the public sphere, changed radically over the 
period we have recounted. In its earliest manifestations, class 
legislation aimed to prevent legislatively granted monopolies. But 
these efforts quickly foundered: class legislation did not reliably pick 
out special interest legislation or even monopolistic legislation—if it 
had, The Slaughterhouse Cases209 should have come out the other way. 
The blatant protectionism of the anti-margarine law upheld in Powell 
v. Pennsylvania210 should have led to reversal if class legislation had 
been successful in striking down laws that reflected rent-seeking 
behavior.211 
Early twentieth century equality law borrowed a variety of ideas 
that do not fit precisely within either the modern public choice or 
political-process formats. Courts did not distinguish between big 
business and minority groups as political players;212 both could be 
“victims” of the political process.213 For example, labor was often 
 
 208. See, e.g., Miller, supra note 196, at 124–26, 127 n.277. 
 209. The Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall) 36 (1872) (rejecting a challenge to a New 
Orleans butcher monopoly). 
 210. Powell v. Pennsylvania, 127 U.S. 678 (1888). 
 211. See Miller, supra note 196, at 85–86. Nor can one say that class legislation was 
invariably antiredistributive; much regulation was upheld under the notion that even if it 
classified, it fell within the police power. See supra Part I. 
 212. See supra Part I.B. 
 213. Political-process theories in constitutional law justify judicial review to protect 
minorities, see ELY, supra note 196, at 97–88; public choice theories urge that democracy is 
flawed because it allows minority interests to obtain benefits at the expense of latent majorities, 
see generally Einer R. Elhauge, Does Interest Group Theory Justify More Intrusive Judicial 
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painted as the great beneficiary of concentrated class politics. That 
belief reflects the truth that both majorities and minorities are, in fact, 
capable of acting as concentrated interests.214 It also reflects the 
historical fact that when businesses invoked class legislation, they 
were claiming to be the victims of feared state socialism, of rule by 
the lower classes. 215 On the other side of the coin, however, the old 
class-legislation precedents were far more willing to evince 
disapproval of laws that classified based on wealth216 (they frequently 
expressed the need for one rule for the rich and poor217) in ways that 
contemporary equal protection case law does not.218 
Ultimately, the country would grow intolerant of business’s 
claims of political victimization; during the Great Depression, there 
was a new acceptance of the harms to liberty from unemployment and 
social insecurity due to old age and infirmity.219 With the twin 
pressures of a president attempting to pack the Court and a Congress 
trying to strip it of jurisdiction, the Supreme Court would adopt a 
deferential attitude toward economic matters.220 As it would signal in 
1938 in Carolene Products, the Court would limit its supervision of 
the legislative process to cases in which it could be more confident of 
majoritarian abuse—cases about free speech, religious bias, and the 
 
Review?, 101 YALE L.J. 31 (1991), reprinted in MAXWELL STEARNS, PUBLIC CHOICE AND 
PUBLIC LAW: READINGS AND COMMENTARY 204, 206–12 (1997) (claiming that larger groups 
have a more difficult time overcoming the free-rider problem than “smaller groups with 
intensely interested members” who are “more likely to secure favorable government action”). 
 214. NEIL K. KOMESAR, IMPERFECT ALTERNATIVES: CHOOSING INSTITUTIONS IN LAW, 
ECONOMICS, AND PUBLIC POLICY 72–74 (1994). 
 215. See sources cited supra note 112. 
 216. See, e.g., Pollock v. Farmers’ Loan & Trust Co., 158 U.S. 601, 674 (1895) (Harlan, J., 
dissenting). 
 217. See sources cited supra note 112 (referring to laws that attempted to classify based on 
wealth). 
 218. It is hornbook law that wealth classifications do not trigger strict scrutiny. See, e.g., 
JOHN E. NOWAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 14.25, at 911 (7th ed. 
2004) (“[Wealth classifications] have no relationship to values with constitutional recognition so 
as to merit active judicial review under the strict scrutiny-compelling interest standard.”). 
 219. William E. Forbath, The New Deal Constitution in Exile, 51 DUKE L.J. 165, 178 (2001). 
 220. ACKERMAN, supra note 1, at 113–14 (noting that the New Deal Justices witnessed 
Congress’s “popular repudiation” of the existing judicial understanding of the Constitution); 
WILLIAM E. LEUCHTENBERG, THE SUPREME COURT REBORN: THE CONSTITUTIONAL 
REVOLUTION IN THE AGE OF ROOSEVELT 219 (1995) (“From 1937 on, the relationship among 
the branches of government shifted dramatically, as an era of ‘judicial supremacy’ gave way to 
deference by the Supreme Court to Congress.”); NOURSE, supra note 5, at 112–20 (describing 
the pincer movement of the president and Congress). 
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oppression of racial and ethnic minorities that loomed so large in the 
years immediately prior to and during World War II.221 
C. Before the Fourteenth Amendment 
Much scholarship on equality in the late-twentieth century has 
struggled with the precise meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment.222 
A good deal of effort has been made to marshal evidence about the 
intent of the framers of the amendment to justify, for example, the 
fact that various aspects of law that seem settled in 2009 were in fact 
consistent or inconsistent with the history of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.223 The history of class legislation disrupts this exercise 
by revealing that the equality tradition in American law is a good deal 
older than the Civil War.224 
The idea that governance and equality are inextricably 
intertwined in a democracy reaches back to the Founding. The 
Declaration of Independence grounds its claims to political freedom 
on equality.225 More importantly, a form of equality is embedded, 
quite literally, in the U.S. Constitution. A government “by the 
people”—one that rejects rule by aristocracy or monarchy—is a 
government built on the foundation of equal citizenship. 
Montesquieu once wrote that the love of democracy was the love of 
equality.226 A government built on the sovereign power of the people 
assumes that, even if people are not equal to each other in attributes 
 
 221. NOURSE, supra note 5, at 142–44. 
 222. Alexander M. Bickel, The Original Understanding and the Segregation Decision, 69 
HARV. L. REV. 1, 58–59 (1955); Charles Fairman, Does the Fourteenth Amendment Incorporate 
the Bill of Rights?, 2 STAN. L. REV. 5, 6 (1955). 
 223. See, e.g., Earl Maltz, The Fourteenth Amendment as Political Compromise, 45 OHIO ST. 
L.J. 933, 933 (1984) (discussing different positions on the original intent of Section 1 of the 
Fourteenth Amendment); Michael W. McConnell, Originalism and the Desegregation Decisions, 
81 VA. L. REV. 947 passim (1995); Saunders, supra note 7, at 246–48 (arguing that, as it was 
originally understood, the Equal Protection Clause did not “giv[e] all persons a substantive 
constitutional right not to be dealt with by the state on the basis of their race” but rather 
“forbade the state to single out any person or group of persons for special benefits or burdens 
without an adequate ‘public purpose’ justification”). 
 224. See NELSON, supra note 23, at 13 (acknowledging a “popular ideology of liberty and 
equality [that] existed in antebellum America. . . . from which section one of the Fourteenth 
Amendment was ultimately derived”). 
 225. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776). 
 226. 1 M. DE SECONDAT, BARON DE MONTESQUIEU, THE SPIRIT OF THE LAWS 45 (J.V. 
Prichard ed., Thomas Nugent trans., G. Bell & Sons 1914) (1748) (“In monarchies and despotic 
governments, nobody aims at equality; this does not so much as enter their thoughts . . . .”). 
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or fortune, that they are equal as citizens.227 Class legislation sought to 
animate this ideal long before the Fourteenth Amendment was 
conceived.228 
Because equality is embedded within the structure of the U.S. 
Constitution, in Articles I’s and II’s notions of representation, its 
spirit transcends the Bill of Rights. Equality is not limited to what 
Professor Robin West has called the “adjudicated Constitution,” the 
rules that courts use to decide cases.229 Equality is not only an 
individual right: because it is entrenched in the structure and 
operation of the political departments, representatives in the political 
branches—and the judiciary when it reviews them—have a duty to 
promote equality. As the history of class legislation demonstrates, 
equality is a matter of legislation as much as of adjudication. 
D. The Lochner Debates 
Since 1990, Lochner revisionism has generated a veritable 
cottage industry of claims about equal protection as the real, and 
more palatable, explanation for the Court’s Lochner-era substantive 
due process decisions.230 This approach was inspired by Professor 
Howard Gillman’s book, The Constitution Besieged, which argues that 
courts were seeking neutrality and generality in imposing substantive 
due process, a position grounded in ideas of class legislation.231 A 
variety of historians and legal scholars, such as Professor G. Edward 
White, have gone so far as to suggest that Lochner itself can be 
described as a class-legislation decision (they are right that it was in 
 
 227. Brown, supra note 1, at 1497; Victoria Nourse, The Vertical Separation of Powers, 49 
DUKE L.J. 749, 751–52 (1999) (positing the vertical relation of citizen to government is the 
central engine of the separation of powers); V.F. Nourse, Toward a New Constitutional 
Anatomy, 56 STAN. L. REV. 835, 840 (2004) (extending that argument). 
 228. See, e.g., Vanzant v. Waddell, 10 Tenn. (2 Yer.) 260, 263–64 (1829); see also GILLMAN, 
supra note 25, at 22 (describing measures designed to stop special interest legislation a century 
before the Lochner era); NELSON, supra note 23, at 13–21 (describing efforts to legislate class 
equality at federal and state levels in the mid-nineteenth century); Saunders, supra note 7, at 285 
(referencing “the antebellum state constitutional principle against partial or special laws”). 
 229. Robin West, Katrina, The Constitution, and the Legal Question Doctrine, 81 CHI.-KENT 
L. REV. 1127, 1129 (2006). 
 230. For a review of some of the revisionism, see generally Bernstein, supra note 13; 
Friedman, History of the Countermajoritarian Difficulty; Gary D. Rowe, Lochner Revisionism 
Revisited, 24 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 221 (1999). In the historical literature, this move begins a 
good deal earlier. 
 231. GILLMAN, supra note 25, at 10 (“[I]t is my contention that the [Lochner-era decisions] 
represented a serious, principled effort to maintain . . . [a] distinction between valid economic 
regulation . . . and invalid ‘class’ legislation . . . .”). 
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fact argued as a class-legislation case, although not decided as one).232 
Some assert that this is the accepted view among historians (even if 
most lawyers and even most constitutionalists would never know it).233 
These claims have in turn generated counterrevisionist arguments, 
such as that by Professor Barry Friedman, that these historians have 
simply found their “friends” and forgotten the ways in which critics 
saw Lochner at the time.234 In short, commentators have spilled a 
good deal of ink on the assumption that class legislation is a doctrine 
of substantive due process that has the potential to rescue Lochner 
from doctrinal infamy. 
Much of this debate depends on the claim that class legislation 
was a doctrine of substantive due process. That categorical judgment 
is too simple. Class legislation was also a very important doctrine of 
equal protection. This descriptive reality has largely been ignored by 
historians in the great Lochner debates and it is a serious omission, 
particularly from those who claim to be providing a “descriptive” 
account of the doctrine.235 Put in other words, the political scientists 
and historians who have adopted the class-legislation theory of 
substantive due process risk confusing what constitutionalists view as 
a basic doctrinal distinction between due process and equal 
protection. To be sure, these doctrines were intertwined in the early 
part of the twentieth century, but lawyers and judges believed that 
there were important constitutional differences.236 This leaves some 
residue of due process unexplained by class-legislation theory. At the 
very least, this history calls into question any historical quick fix to 
modern substantive due process dilemmas. Professor David Bernstein 
may be right that historians and political scientists take this view to be 
gospel,237 but it seems highly unlikely that constitutionalists (who will 
make no mistake between an equal protection and a due process 
 
 232. White, supra note 16, at 101–03. 
 233. Bernstein, supra note 13, at 19. 
 234. Friedman, History of the Countermajoritarian Difficulty, supra note 84, at 1402–28. 
 235. Among the vast number of articles debating Lochner, there is one exception to this 
omission: David E. Bernstein, Essays: Fifty Years After Bolling v. Sharpe: Bolling, Equal 
Protection, Due Process, and Lochnerphobia, 93 GEO. L.J. 1253 (2005). 
 236. See, e.g., Truax v. Corrigan, 257 U.S. 312, 331–39 (1921) (discussing the doctrines of 
equal protection and due process, and the distinctions between them). 
 237. See Bernstein, supra note 13, at 13–15. 
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claim) will be easily persuaded that a theory of equal protection can 
somehow solve the Lochner problem.238 
III.  MODERN EQUALITY THEORY AND PRACTICE 
If the early-twentieth-century history of equality law disrupts the 
conventional history, it also has implications for equality theory and 
practice. A number of constitutionalists, most recently Professor Jack 
Balkin, have sought to revive class legislation as an equal protection 
ideal.239 There are many wise reasons for this shift in rhetoric, but we 
caution those invoking the term that the history of this idea was one 
of both promise and failure. To successfully reinvigorate class 
legislation, scholars would have to develop its supporting governance 
theory in a way earlier advocates never did. As we explain, the “new” 
class legislation must imagine itself as part of a much richer theory of 
abuse of legislative power. It must become a rule of legislation rather 
than adjudication. In that spirit, we offer a proposal for a 
“convergence-forcing” view of equal protection. 
A. A More Attractive Ideal? 
Many constitutionalists believe that equality law is unraveling.240 
Scholars have been relentlessly critical of the Supreme Court’s 
requirement that, in facially neutral cases, the claimant must show 
“intent” to discriminate.241 Complaints about the conventional tiered 
model of equal protection—which requires a high level of judicial 
scrutiny in some cases whereas only an intermediate or low level in 
others—are legion and growing;242 so are significant departures from 
 
 238. One of us has the view, expressed elsewhere, that the Lochner “problem” has been 
made into a problem for moderns based on a false view of the nature of right; moderns read 
back into the past a contemporary notion of right that cannot fairly describe the average 
doctrinal consciousness of the early part of the twentieth century. See Nourse, supra note 84 
(manuscript at 2–3, 44–46). 
 239. See Balkin, supra note 7, at 855 (“[L]imits on abortion are a form of class 
legislation . . . .”); Saunders, supra note 7, at 301 (arguing that important aspects of the Equal 
Protection Clause’s background were lost to modern interpreters). 
 240. See generally Goldberg, supra note 1 (questioning whether the three-tiered equal 
protection framework is still needed); Siegel, supra note 193 (describing the stratifying effects of 
facially neutral state action). 
 241. See, e.g., Goldberg, supra note 1, at 494; Siegel, supra note 193, at 1113; Sklansky supra 
note 8, at 1306–11. 
 242. See, e.g., Goldberg, supra note 1, at 484 (“[T]he problems with the three-tiered 
framework for judicial scrutiny are sufficient to warrant immediate consideration of an 
alternative standard for review.”); Wilson Huhn, The Jurisprudential Revolution: Unlocking 
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the standard doctrine, as the gay rights cases of Romer v. Evans243 and 
Lawrence v. Texas244 demonstrate.245 Most constitutionalists know that 
the doctrine they teach is in large part false: it is hornbook law that 
wealth classifications do not yield heightened scrutiny,246 yet it is also 
true that wealth can be enough to strike down a law that deprives one 
of the right to vote247 or the right to an appeal;248 similarly, distinctions 
that do not merit strict scrutiny, such as mental retardation,249 can in 
fact trigger stringent review.250 The gay rights cases, as most 
constitutionalists know, signal a major shift in constitutional doctrine 
away from the traitist model.251 Indeed, Romer signals that class 
legislation may be a part of the future of a new equal protection.252 
 
Human Potential in Grutter and Lawrence, 12 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 65, 104 (2003) (noting 
that Lawrence and Grutter call into question the stability of traditional equal protection 
standards of review); Calvin Massey, The New Formalism: Requiem for Tiered Scrutiny?, 6 U. 
PA. J. CONST. L. 945, 970 (2004) (observing that “[w]e are now uncertain about the utility” of 
traditional equal protection classifications). For early criticism, see generally Jeffrey M. 
Shaman, Cracks in the Structure: The Coming Breakdown of the Levels of Scrutiny, 45 OHIO ST. 
L.J. 161, 163 (1984) (“[T]he system of multi-level scrutiny has suffered serious strains, which 
may reveal that it is fundamentally flawed and destined to collapse.”). 
 243. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996). 
 244. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003). 
 245. Neither of the two most important gay rights cases of the past decade used standard 
tiered analysis. See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 586 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing that the majority 
applied an “unheard-of form of rational-basis review”); Romer, 517 U.S. at 640 (Scalia, J., 
dissenting) (accusing the majority of failing to employ “normal ‘rational basis’ analysis”); see 
also City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 451 (1985) (Stevens, J., 
concurring) (recommending a single standard because, “[i]n fact, our cases have not delineated 
three—or even one or two—such well-defined standards” and arguing that, “[r]ather, our cases 
reflect a continuum of judgmental responses to differing classifications”); id. at 460 (Marshall, J., 
concurring and dissenting in part) (“I have long believed the level of scrutiny employed in an 
equal protection case should vary with ‘the constitutional and societal importance of the interest 
adversely affected and the recognized invidiousness of the basis upon which the particular 
classification is drawn.’” (quoting San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 99 
(1973) (Marshall, J., dissenting))). For an argument that equality law has been subsumed under 
the idea of liberty, see generally Brown, supra note 1. 
 246. See supra note 218. 
 247. See Harper v. Va. Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 670 (1966) (“[C]lassifications which 
might invade or restrain [voting rights] must be closely scrutinized . . . .”). 
 248. See Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 13, 19–20 (1956) (holding that indigent persons must 
be furnished with free copies of trial transcripts necessary to file an appeal). 
 249. See Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 442 (declining to apply heightened scrutiny to review laws 
dealing with mental retardation). 
 250. See id. at 447–50 (refusing to defer to the state’s proffered rationales and instead 
probing the strength and reasonableness of those rationales). 
 251. See, e.g., Kenneth L. Karst, The Liberties of Equal Citizens: Groups and the Due 
Process Clause, 55 UCLA L. REV. 99, 136–38 (2007) (noting a trend away from equal protection 
categories); see also Nan D. Hunter, Living with Lawrence, 88 MINN. L. REV. 1103, 1104 (2004) 
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At least in part in response to these problems, a few lonely and 
brave scholars have attempted to revive the class-legislation ideal as a 
solution to modern equality problems. Professor Melissa Saunders 
has argued that class legislation could resolve modern voting rights 
cases;253 Professor Mark Yudof has invoked class legislation to 
understand sex discrimination case law.254 And, most provocatively, 
Professor Jack Balkin has argued that class legislation is likely to 
inform the Supreme Court’s reproductive rights jurisprudence: that 
equality, in class-legislation form, could help resolve the seemingly 
great constitutional issue of the early twenty-first century, abortion.255 
There are many reasons to believe that class legislation is in fact 
a much more attractive idea of equal protection than the standard 
antidiscrimination and anticlassification models offer. First, class 
legislation scrutinizes laws that establish hierarchies among groups, 
which follows intuitive ideas of equality better than perfect proxies256 
or levels of scrutiny. This mirrors the terracing that makes 
subordination a much more attractive equality model than a standard 
that demands sameness simpliciter (sameness in what respect?). 
Second, class legislation has more of the look of a disparate-impact 
standard than one might suspect: the analysis not only considers 
actual (as opposed to linguistic) burdens but also asks whether those 
burdens are justified by a public purpose (the police-power inquiry).257 
Third, class legislation shifts the debate away from the notion of an 
equality law limited to some special sets of persons marked by race, 
sex, or illegitimacy. Traitism (the tendency to reduce equality to 
particular physical or social traits) invites repetitive arguments about 
special rights and resentment by those who do not appear to share the 
 
(contending that Lawrence “mark[s] the emergence of a new approach in substantive due 
process analysis”). 
 252. See Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 635 (1996) (“[C]lass legislation . . . [is] obnoxious to 
the prohibitions of the Fourteenth Amendment.” (quoting The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 
24 (1883))). 
 253. Saunders, supra note 7, at 327. 
 254. Yudof, supra note 7, at 1387–407. 
 255. Balkin, supra note 7, at 855–63. 
 256. Cf. Mary Anne Case, “The Very Stereotype the Law Condemns”: Constitutional Sex 
Discrimination Law as a Quest for Perfect Proxies, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 1447, 1455–77 (2000) 
(discussing ideals of perfect proxy conception). 
 257. The vast majority of cases in which class-legislation claims were made failed because 
there was a public purpose for the classification. This mirrors the inquiry in disparate impact 
cases about whether there is a common justification for the disparate impact. Special thanks to 
Professor Martha Fineman for making this point to us. 
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preferred traits.258 More importantly, it forsakes the great ideal of 
equality law which protects all persons, not particular people or 
particular classes. In that spirit, the class-legislation idea holds out the 
possibility of moving beyond a particular list of strictly scrutinized 
traits to a postidentity, postformal inequality analysis.259 
If class legislation has a number of attractive features, it also 
poses risks. If it becomes a standard focused on identifying instances 
of singling out, which the majority opinion in Romer v. Evans 
suggests,260 then it is unlikely to do much. First, all law singles out. As 
the history of class legislation demonstrates, over time, this truth can 
easily swallow equality’s larger aspirations. Second, singling out 
depends on a common baseline that may be highly contested 
(equality is an inherently comparative norm). The less-than-rosy 
history of class legislation indicates that the doctrine could repeat this 
pattern unless the appropriate baseline is elaborated.261 As the work 
of Professors Cass Sunstein, Peter Westen, and Ken Simons on 
baselines in constitutional law has demonstrated,262 one of the 
persistent problems in equality theory is the failure to describe the 
baseline from which one is making a comparison. As the history of 
class legislation developed, this baseline problem was solved in 
individual cases by using a liberty interest as the baseline, when 
liberty meant an activity universally shared (then, the claim of free 
labor). This union of liberty and equality may sound dangerous to 
some,263 but, as Professors Kenneth Karst and Pam Karlan have 
argued,264 the union of these claims may be stronger constitutionally 
 
 258. We are thinking here of rhetoric surrounding affirmative action cases. 
 259. On the ambiguities of wealth classifications, see supra note 14. 
 260. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 633 (1996). 
 261. The great debates about labor and capital often depended on a baseline of business 
victimization that most today would find strange. 
 262. See Simons, Equality, supra note 130 passim; Simons, Egalitarian Norms, supra note 
130 passim; Sunstein, supra note 130, at 883–902; Westen, supra note 130 passim. 
 263. Professor Cass Sunstein, for example, argues that the clauses are aimed at different 
goals and that the analysis therefore must be independent. Cass R. Sunstein, Essay, Sexual 
Orientation and the Constitution: A Note on the Relationship Between Due Process and Equal 
Protection, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 1161, 1174 (1988). 
 264. See Pamela S. Karlan, Equal Protection, Due Process, and the Stereoscopic Fourteenth 
Amendment, 33 MCGEORGE L. REV. 473, 474 (2002) (“[T]he ideas of equality and liberty 
expressed in the equal protection and due process clauses each emerge from and reinforce the 
other.”); Karst, supra note 251 passim (describing how egalitarian values furthered the 
development of substantive due process). 
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than their parts. The reason for that, we believe, is that it helps to 
solve the baseline problem.265 
If class legislation is to provide anything but a classification 
standard, we believe scholars should take a more intensive look at the 
doctrine’s aims and assumptions. Class legislation’s ideals require 
courts to do what they never explicitly did—to elaborate a theory of 
unequal legislation. Based on an analogy to corporate law, we suggest 
a focus on majority abuse of legislative power. We propose a standard 
that asks courts to force legislatures to link the fates of majorities and 
minorities. We conclude by applying this model to the much-debated 
100-to-1 disparity in crack and powder cocaine penalties. 
B. Equality as a Convergence-Forcing Rule 
The central feature of early-twentieth-century equal protection 
doctrine was the desire to prevent favoritism in legislation: “the 
minority are safe, [if] the majority, who make the law, are operated 
on by it equally with the others.”266 This reflects both ancient and 
modern common sense, as shown by work from a wide array of 
scholars from Professors Derrick Bell to John Rawls to Rebecca 
Brown. For majorities to protect minorities, they must see it in their 
interest, and, to see it in their interest, they must consider themselves 
in the shoes of the minority.267 To make this a reality and more than a 
theory, however, there must be a “linkage-forcing” move.268 
 
 265. It also makes sense, not as a principle of textual classification, but as a statement about 
the dynamics of the legislative process. Indeed, the notion that legislatures have the incentive to 
foist off burdens onto the few was predicted by the moderate New Deal warrior and opponent 
of Lochnerism, Justice Robert Jackson. See Ry. Express Agency v. New York, 336 U.S. 106, 112 
(1949) (Jackson, J., concurring) (“The framers of the Constitution knew . . . that there is no 
more effective practical guaranty against arbitrary and unreasonable government than to 
require that the principles of law which officials would impose upon a minority must be imposed 
generally.”). 
 266. Bank of the State v. Cooper, 10 Tenn. (2 Yer.) 599, 606 (1831); see also, e.g., Ward v. 
Barnard, 1 Aik. 121, 123 (Vt. 1825). In Ward, counsel argued, “If the legislature have power to 
select any individual, as the object of particular legislation, and exempt him from obligations to 
which all others are subject, it may be the instrument of the grossest favouritism; or, in times of 
political excitement, of the most cruel persecution.” Id. 
 267. See Bell, supra note 37, at 523 (describing this “interest convergence” in the context of 
school desegregation); Brown, supra note 1, at 1515–23 (describing this “communion of 
interest” and the role it played in late eighteenth-century America); John Rawls, Justice as 
Fairness, in COLLECTED PAPERS 47, 49–52 (Samuel Freeman ed., 1999). 
 268. By “linkage-forcing” move, we refer to a move that would force majorities to address 
what they are likely to be indifferent to—the fate of rules that are likely to affect only 
minorities. 
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The class-legislation ideal never had a coherent political theory 
(it was in some cases focused on monopoly, in others on mob-like 
majorities) but its original premise—that a democracy cannot have 
one rule for the rich and another for the poor, one for the majority 
and another for the minority—invites questions about the 
representational duties of a majority to a minority. More specifically, 
it invites an inquiry about abuse of majority representation.269 Taking 
cues from standard principal-agent theory, and the duty of the 
principal to the agent, we propose an inquiry that would ask whether 
the majority had abused its power by deliberate indifference to the 
interests of minorities. 
The linkage-forcing move comes from viewing equality as a duty, 
a fiduciary duty of the representative to all the representative’s 
constituents. Just as a shareholder controlling the majority of votes 
may not adopt rules locking out minorities or burdening them at the 
expense of the corporation,270 the political representative may not 
award benefits to a majority if the burdens are foisted entirely on a 
minority, unless the entire polity receives countervailing benefits. 
Similarly, in the elective sphere, one can characterize the 
representational relationship as raising a conflict of interest between 
majorities and minorities.271 The principal (the representative) stands 
to benefit from supporting majority positions (by gaining reelection) 
and by locking out minorities. Assuming that the representative has a 
duty to represent all voters, just as corporate shareholders have a 
duty to represent the best interest of the corporation as a whole, 
 
 269. In referring to an abuse of majoritarian power, we were inspired by the work of 
Professor Yasmin Dawood in the election context. Yasmin Dawood, The Antidomination Model 
and the Judicial Oversight of Democracy, 96 GEO. L. REV. 1411, 1428–38 (2008). 
 270. See, e.g., Zahn v. Transamerica Corp., 162 F.2d 36, 42 (3d Cir. 1947) (recognizing the 
fiduciary duty of majority shareholders to minority shareholders); Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Levien, 
280 A.2d 717, 720 (Del. 1971) (setting out the test for regulating self-dealing transactions that 
benefit majority shareholders at the expense of minority shareholders); see also Zohar Goshen, 
The Efficiency of Controlling Corporate Self-Dealing: Theory Meets Reality, 91 CAL. L. REV. 
393, 396–97, 399–400 (2003) (explaining the fiduciary duty of a majority shareholder to minority 
shareholders and the rules governing self-dealing transactions that burden minority 
shareholders at the expense of the majority shareholder). 
 271. Professor Rebecca Brown has argued that courts should ask, in both liberty and 
equality cases, whether majorities would in fact apply the challenged rule to themselves (would 
majorities really want, for example, the police to enforce prohibitions on sexual acts in their 
own bedrooms, as opposed to someone else’s bedrooms?). See Brown, supra note 1, at 1493 
(describing the “principle of equality” as “[m]ake any rules you want, as long as they apply to 
everyone”). This proposal, we argue, reflects a larger concern for the potential for majority self-
dealing; it should trigger the inquiry because it suggests majoritarian self-dealing. 
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lockouts of minority interests raise questions of fairness and common 
benefit. Corporate law addresses the self-dealing problem in several 
ways, in some cases by requiring minority approval or sometimes by 
requiring that the transaction be entirely fair to the whole.272 
This approach would require courts to act as deliberative 
conscience: the aim would be to prevent entrenchment of majority 
positions, which is to say deliberate indifference to rules that protect 
majority interests at the expense of the liberty of minorities. Such an 
anti-entrenchment rule would ask whether a reasonable person in the 
burdened party’s shoes could say that the majority was trying to 
entrench its status at the expense of the liberty of those to whom it 
was indifferent. The lesson to be taken from the history of early 
twentieth-century equality law is not a new moniker for what 
Professor Robin West has called the “adjudicated Constitution”273 but 
rather a movement toward an “embedded constitutionalism,”274 one 
which seeks to force the active consideration and deliberation of 
constitutional values in more powerful institutions—in this case, in 
legislatures. 
One might think of this as a vertical theory of equality in the 
following sense.275 One is not trying, under equal protection, to create 
linguistic or classificatory symmetry, to target the bad motives of 
government actors, or to achieve equal outcomes. One envisions the 
harm differently; it is a harm that embraces majorities’ abuses of 
power in failing to represent minorities. Majorities always have the 
incentive to self-deal, to garner benefits to themselves, and to 
dispense burdens on others. A burden on liberty is a cue, a signal that 
the law must be scrutinized to determine whether it is a guise to 
perpetuate or to create inequality among citizens. This is particularly 
important in cases in which the burden is imposed on those who have 
historically been designated as lesser citizens. The idea recalls the 
great Learned Hand formula in tort: multiply the likelihood of injury 
by the cost of avoidance to yield negligence;276 here, multiply the 
likelihood of serious burden by a history of second-class citizenship 
 
 272. See Goshen, supra note 270, at 396–97. 
 273. See supra note 229 and accompanying text. 
 274. On embedded constitutionalism, see Scott & Holder, supra note 36, at 238–40; Desai, 
supra note 36, at 590–94. 
 275. See, e.g., Nourse, supra note 227, at 759 (grounding the departments in their “vertical” 
relationships to the people). 
 276. See United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir. 1947). 
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and the inference grows that the governing majority has aimed to 
perpetuate and entrench its winning hand. 
We also suggest that it may be more important for courts, in 
cases of democratic indifference, to act as catalysts277—to provoke 
representational responses rather than to strike down a law 
simpliciter. For example, in implementing this ideal, courts might be 
more successful developing a doctrine of “equality abstention.” 
Assume that one has a case involving a persistent and pervasive racial 
impact. In that case, the court would not strike down the law, but 
would refuse to apply it unless Congress came back with a finding 
that satisfied the general principal-agent standard: either the affected 
minority voted to support the law, or Congress produced persuasive 
evidence that the law was entirely fair to all, including the 
disadvantaged racial minority. The court would abstain until the 
legislature responded.278 This abstention would put the onus on the 
legislature, where it belongs. It would lessen complaints of activist 
judicial review because it would be deliberation-forcing rather than 
inhibiting.279 If the legislature did not deliberate within a reasonable 
time, then courts would not enforce the law (this sanction, in the case 
of the criminal law, would almost ensure that there would be some 
deliberation because criminal laws typically have strong majoritarian 
salience and prosecutors have incentives to communicate such 
decisions to Congress).280 
 
 277. See, e.g., Joanne Scott & Susan Sturm, Courts as Catalysts: Re-Thinking the Judicial 
Role in New Governance, 13 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 565, 570–71 (2007). 
 278. Imagine the situation in Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942), in which the 
legislature had excluded itself (and other “high-class criminals”) from the scope of the law, id. at 
537. The Court could have returned the law to the legislature, asking them to debate the 
exclusion and provide data on the claimed “genetic” distinctions between habitual political 
criminals and habitual chicken thieves. If the legislature failed to deliberate or failed to produce 
the information and simply passed the law again, the Court should strike it down as an abuse of 
majoritarian power. 
 279. Not all deliberation is good, as anyone who has ever been to a faculty meeting can 
attest. The point of this rule is structured deliberation to produce better participation and 
information. Closed groups tend to reaffirm the group’s views, increasing ill-informed and 
prejudicial decisions. See generally CASS R. SUNSTEIN, INFOTOPIA (2006) (describing the 
problems of decisionmaking by groups isolated from outside information). 
 280. This follows not from any abstract logical proposition but rather from the demands of 
crime politics. When, for example, an appellate court ruled that plea bargaining violated the 
bribery statute, United States. v. Singleton, 144 F.3d 1343, 1357–58 (10th Cir. 1998) (decided 
July 1, 1998), rev’d en banc, 165 F.3d 1297 (10th Cir. 1999), Congress responded almost 
immediately with proposals attacking the decision, Effective Prosecution and Public Safety Act 
of 1998, S. 2311, 105th Cong. (1998) (introduced July 15, 1998) (noting the Tenth Circuit’s 
decision and indicating that the bill was introduced in response to that decision); Safe Schools, 
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Consider the example of the 100-to-1 difference in penalties 
applied to crack cocaine versus powder cocaine.281 For some time, the 
Sentencing Commission and scholars have worried that the statutory 
difference results in significant racial impacts.282 As one leading 
criminologist has explained, 
No other feature of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines has been 
viewed more critically than the 100:1 crack-powder cocaine disparity 
built into the guidelines . . . . The disparity is particularly distressing 
because crack defendants are primarily black and powder 
defendants are primarily white and Hispanic, so the differential 
treatment can too easily be seen as a manifestation of racial 
discrimination. Thus, there have been efforts in many quarters to 
call attention to this concern and to drastically diminish or eliminate 
this disparity.283 
Equal protection law, however, provides no real basis to attack 
the 100-to-1 ratio. Strict scrutiny does not apply because the law is 
facially neutral on the question of race, and disparate impact analysis 
only yields a finding of inequality if there is evidence that the law was 
passed with the specific intent to harm minorities (a very unlikely 
case today).284 The ancient ideal of class legislation does little better: 
under the old rule, the question would be whether Congress had 
made one rule for the rich and another for the poor, one for the white 
 
Safe Streets, and Secure Borders Act of 1998, S. 2484, 105th Cong. § 2303 (introduced Aug. 16, 
1998) (referring specifically to the decision in United States v. Singleton and offering findings 
supporting prosecutorial deal making). Ultimately, these proposals were mooted when the 
Tenth Circuit reversed itself when sitting en banc. See Singleton, 165 F.3d at 1297 (decided Jan. 
9, 1999). 
 281. See Kimbrough v. United States, 128 S. Ct. 558, 566–68 (2007) (considering this 
sentencing disparity under the federal Sentencing Guidelines). 
 282. U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, REPORT TO THE CONGRESS: COCAINE AND FEDERAL 
SENTENCING POLICY 8 (2007) [hereinafter 2007 REPORT], available at http://www.ussc.gov/r_ 
congress/cocaine2007.pdf; U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, REPORT TO THE CONGRESS: COCAINE 
AND FEDERAL SENTENCING POLICY 102–03 (2002), available at http://www.ussc.gov/r_ 
congress/02crack/2002crackrpt.pdf; Sklansky, supra note 8, at 1288–89. The controversy has 
been going on at least since 1995, when the Sentencing Commission first proposed to change the 
crack-powder differential. See Amendments to the Sentencing Guidelines for United States 
Courts, 60 Fed. Reg. 25,074 (May 10, 1995) (relevant portions rejected by Congress in Act of 
Oct. 30, 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-38, 109 Stat. 334). 
 283. Alfred Blumstein, The Notorious 100:1 Crack: Powder Disparity—The Data Tell Us 
That It Is Time To Restore the Balance, 16 FED. SENT’G REP. 87, 87 (2003). 
 284. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 240 (1976) (“[T]he invidious quality of a law 
claimed to be racially discriminatory must ultimately be traced to a racially discriminatory 
purpose.”). On the difficulties with the original equal protection challenges, see Sklanksy, supra 
note 8, at 1306–11. 
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and one for the black. However inviting that question may be, 
historically, the answers did not always favor those who would be 
favored in 2009. Under the class-legislation theory of old, the police 
power (the power to regulate general public safety, health, and 
welfare) could trump equality concerns. As we have indicated, 
although class-legislation ideals may confer some benefits, this case 
shows the potential pitfalls: the police power has been used to support 
a variety of practices viewed in 2009 as intolerable, such as racial 
segregation.285 
We suggest a different inquiry: we would ask whether Congress 
had satisfied its fiduciary duty to both the majority and the minority. 
First, was there impartial evidence that Congress was deliberately 
indifferent to the interests of the minority? Second, assuming that 
there were such evidence,286 was Congress’s statutory scheme 
nevertheless justified by its entire fairness, or would the minority vote 
to approve the practice?287 If minority voices in Congress subsequent 
to the court ruling voted for the statute, the inquiry would be over. If 
not, then the Congress should hold hearings to determine whether the 
statute was entirely fair to the minority. 
In our crack-powder cocaine example, courts should refuse to 
apply the 100-to-1 penalty until Congress held a minority vote or 
passed a resolution explaining why the penalty was nonetheless fair to 
the minority. Because politicians consider crime very important and 
because prosecutors have ready access to legislators, it seems unlikely 
that legislators would ignore the threat of nonenforcement. At the 
least, the resulting debate would be an improvement over a 
jurisprudence that imagines equality as the “hostility” of 
legislatures288—because the real problem with entrenchment is 
 
 285. See, e.g., Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 549–51 (1896) (explaining that the police 
power would justify race discrimination unlike other discriminations, which were arbitrary); id. 
at 545 (stating that antimiscegenation statutes were “within the police power of the State”). 
 286. There is a good deal of evidence, given the Sentencing Commissions’s persistent efforts 
to change the rules, that Congress was deliberately indifferent to the effects of the rule on 
minority populations. See 2007 REPORT, supra note 282, at 6–9. 
 287. Cf. Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 711 (Del. 1983) (holding that “entire 
fairness” encompassed both “fair dealing” and “fair price”). 
 288. Indeed, one of the great ironies of equal protection law is that it relies on an intent 
standard, see, e.g., Davis, 426 U.S. at 239–40, that elsewhere its advocates claim cannot exist; in 
the sphere of statutory interpretation, for example, it is commonly said that collective bodies 
like legislatures have no intent. Justice Scalia has argued that legislative intent does not exist, 
ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW 32 
(1997), and suggests that “under the guise or even the self-delusion of pursuing unexpressed 
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structured indifference and abuse of majoritarian power. Had 
Congress been forced, on threat of holding the crack law 
unenforceable, to explain in a reasoned way its specific choice of 
penalties set at 100 to 1—as opposed to 50 to 1, or 20 to 1, or 3 to 1—
in light of its racial impacts, the debate would have been framed as 
much in terms of equality as in soft and weak positions on crime. It 
would have also provided minorities an incentive to voice their 
approval or disapproval. 
CONCLUSION 
This Article has challenged the consensus position that the Equal 
Protection Clause was moribund at the beginning of the twentieth 
century. Equality arguments were once as banal to the average lawyer 
as claims based on the right to contract or property (what lawyers 
have come to call substantive due process claims). Most importantly, 
the ideal of equality was not, even in an era long before political-
process theories, a matter of classification simpliciter. From before 
the Civil War, and even during the Lochner era, equality aspired to a 
theory of governance. 
The lesson of the “lost” history of equal protection is not a form 
of modernist originalism in which one resurrects the past to reform 
the present. This is a history that aims to learn from the successes and 
the failures of the past. Most Americans, we suspect, believe in the 
ideal of class legislation: they believe that one rule should govern 
both the rich and the poor (even if a constitutional lawyer would have 
to explain that wealth classifications receive no special treatment). 
How then is such a principle to be implemented in a world in which 
courts believe equality is a matter of formal classification? The 
answer is to rethink the context of the rule as much as the rule itself, 
to rethink the ways in which this political ideal is institutionally 
embedded. The judiciary has never been a great bastion of equality. 
Indeed, this history shows that formal equality can protect those who 
seem the least deserving of protection. 
If courts have failed, then it is time to turn to other institutions; it 
is time to consider something more than judicial review as the only 
way that courts provoke consideration of equality norms. Class 
legislation was not simply a different idea of equality; it assumed a 
 
legislative intents, common-law judges will in fact pursue their own objectives and desires,” id. 
at 17–18. 
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different idea of where inequality was most likely to be prevented—in 
the legislative process. Perhaps it is time that courts turned the 
question back to the legislature and exerted a form of equality 
abstention that forces legislatures to ask whether the majority has 
fulfilled its representational duties to the minority. The Supreme 
Court has always been leery of deciding matters of equality that 
depend on effects rather than intent, but this is all the more reason 
for the Court to place the burden on those who are responsible for 
the creation and the effects of legislation. This, and only this, would 
be a real theory of class legislation. 
